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SUMMARY
"Al-Ash*ari's Discussion of the Philosophi­
cal Problem of Free Will and Predestination” is designed 
to explore the discussion of one of the controversial 
issues in Islamic theology and philosophy. The problem 
of Free Will and Predestination, without doubt, poses 
contradictory positions in Islamic thought. The up­
holders of the concept of Free Will will surely be able 
to maintain the justice of God, but will face the pro­
blem of the absoluteness of God, Whereas, the upholders 
of the concept of Predestination will surely be able to 
establish the sovereignty of God but will face the pro­
blem of the justice of God, The important question 
emerging from this contradiction is that of the human 
share of responsibility for what has been done. It is 
to be believed that man will be punished in the life 
hereafter for his wrong doings and he will be rewarded 
for his good works. This study will try to introduce 
one of the solutions given by a medieval Muslim scholar, 
al-Ash^ari, who was trying to reconcile these contra­
dictory positions through a theory which he developed, 
that is, * the theory of acquisition’.
The study is presented by producing various 
chapters which are relevant to the problem concerned
XI
and under which this problem is treated. Through this 
study, we shall not only discuss al-Ash^arl's arguments 
and positions, but we shall also see the comparison bet­
ween al-Ash^ari and various scholars from the upholders 
of Free Will (the Mu*tazilites) as well as the‘upholders 
of Predestination (the Jabarites),
In the introduction to the study, we shall
introduce al-Ash^ari as an orthodox middle path"scholar
who valued highly the use of philosophical arguments,
but in addition, prized even highly the revelation of
the Holy Book, al-Qur'an. Al-Ash^ari was at first a
follower of the Mu^  tazilites, but finally turned to
, _
orthodoxy. This study will only touch on al-Ash ari’s 
position when he became the orthodox middle path scho­
lar.
The remaining five chapters will directly 
deal with the problem of Free Will and Predestination. 
In the chapter concerning the knowledge of God, al-Ash^- 
ari holds that the knowledge of God is eternal in the 
sense that He knows the past, present and future. He 
also holds that God knows by knowledge which entails 
that the knowledge of God is not identical with His es­
sence. However, al-Ash^ari believes that the knowledge 
of God is not distinct from God Himself. This means
Ill
that God's knowledge is not distinct from Him, whether 
as a quality apart from God's essence or as an attri­
bute distinct from God.
In chapter three, the discussion of‘ the crea- 
tedness of human action, it will be shown that al-Ash^- 
ari proves that human actions are created by God as 
they really are. This is in direct opposition to the 
position of the Mu*tazilites who hold that men are 
free to act. We discuss several opinions from the 
Mu^tazilites scholars regarding this problem. Al- 
Ash *arl, then proves that God is the true and effi­
cient creator of all actions of man whether they are 
compulsory or voluntary. Moreover, he said that the 
compulsory and voluntary actions are alike in creation.
The discussion in chapter three will face 
the problem of the creation of evil. This chapter is 
introduced to analyse the problem in which al-Ash^ari 
maintains that God is the creator of evil in the sense 
that He creates evil to be bad and vain. From the so­
lution given by al-Ash*ari, we learn that al-Ash*ari 
believes that the creation of evil by God is ultima­
tely the evil of another being distinct from God Him­
self. At the end of the chapter, we elaborate the con­
cept of the justice of God in relation to the creation 
of evil•
IV
Another problem which is of interest and 
relevant to the discussion of human action is the ques­
tion of human capacity. This will be discussed in 
chapter five of the study. Al-Ash*ari claims that ca­
pacity is created by God. Capacity is with the act 
and for the act, that is, the capacity is with a cer­
tain action and for that certain action, not for an­
other action. This means that the man for whom God 
does not create a capacity cannot acquire anything.
After exploring various topics which are 
relevant to the main problem of this study, in the 
final chapter we discuss al-Ash*ari* s interpretation 
of the theory of acquisition which ties up every pro- 
lem discussed before. The theory of acquisition is 
regarded as the theory in which al-Ash ^ari tracks a 
middle path position between the two extreme schools. 
It is to be understood that the theory of acquisition 
was not new to the Muslims during al-Ash*ari's time, 
but had been introduced by other scholars long before. 
However, the interpretation introduced by al-Ash*ari 
, makes this theory more reasonable and understandable.
Through this theory and with the help of the previous 
discussions, al-Ash‘’ari claims that the concept of the 
human share of responsibility is not inconsistent with
Vthe concept of the foreknowledge of God, God's omni­
potence and the concept of God's Will.
Finally, it is hoped that this study will 
give an introduction to the study of al-Ash^ari's 
ideas in the circle of Islamic thought.
: f
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In this study we shall concentrate on one 
particular problem that is, the problem of Free Will and 
Predestination. We shall deal with it by examining the 
position of the Mu‘tazilites and also the refutation of 
their position by al-Ash*ari. The problem of Free Will 
and Predestination illustrates two extreme positions: 
first, there is the position of the Mu‘tazilites who 
maintained that man has full power over everything inclu­
ding the human will and human actions and has complete 
freedom of choice. Second, there is the position of the 
Jabarites who claimed that man has no part in determining 
his own actions: all comes from God. Between these two 
extremes, al-Ash‘ari tried to hold an intermediate posi­
tion.
We shall begin this study with a brief outline 
of the rise of these two extreme schools in Islam. Before 
al-Ash*ari, Muslim theologians and scholars were divided 
into different schools and groups. Historically, Muslims 
were united during the lifetime of the Prophet. All pro­
blems were referred to him and he was regarded as the re­
ligious leader as well as the political ruler. But, when 
the fourth authentic, or "rightly-guided" caliph, *Ali b. 
Abi Talib (656-661 A.D) was sworn in, he was opposed by 
an able contender, Mu*awiyah b. Abi Sufyan. This strug­
gle caused the battle of Siffin (65 7 A.D), resulting in 
the defeat of *Ali at the hand of Mu‘awiyah. It is re­
ported as follows;
"Just as *Ali was about to snatch the fruit., of 
victory in a battle at Siffin in 65 7, Mu*awiyah 
tricked him into calling off the fighting and 
consenting to arbitration, which eventually re­
sulted in *Ali's downfall."!
This arbitration marked the beginning of Islamic 
political differences which developed later into the theo­
logical differences. From it, Muslims were confronted with the 
question of who was right and who was wrong in this battle.
It developed into the more theological question of 'who is 
a Muslim’ and 'is a Muslim still be a Muslim if he has com-
1. M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, (New York 
and London, Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 52.
mitted a grave sin'? These are among the questions which
arose at that time. The Shi*ites, who gave unquestioned
support to *Ali, claimed that:
"The Prophet had conferred the Imamate j^ CaliphateJ 
on *Ali and nominated him as his successor. Thus 
*Ali was the first Imam by ordinance."2
Moreover, they claimed that the Imams or caliphs are sin­
less and they also claimed that *Ali and his successors 
are the only lawful caliphs.
"The imam is impeccable, i.e., free from all sins, 
great or small. He is immune from error- Every­
thing that he says or does is inviolate."3
This position was strongly contested by another group of 
theologians called the Kharijites. This group emerged 
at the same time and were the supporters of *Ali in that 
battle, but abandoned the camp of *Ali due to their dis­
agreement with his decision to attend the meeting at the 
end of that battle. This group maintained that *Ali also 
committed a grave sin because he looked to an arbitrator 
to solve the problem rather than God.
"*Ali also committed,according to them, a major sin 
when he accepted the 'arbitration* or 'one besides 
God'."4
2. Abu'1 A*la Maudoodi, 'Political Thought In Early Islam', 
in A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. 1., edited by 
M.M. Sharif, (Weisbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1963),
pp. 656 - 672 (p. 667).
3. Ibid., p. 667.
4. Ibid., p. 668.
Another group which was neutral between the 
two extremes was the Murji'ites. They came into existence 
when discussion of the problem of the consequences of the 
battle of Siffin took place, claiming that the outcome 
should have been left in the hands of God.
"He alone would tell, on the Day of Judgement, 
which of them struggled for the right cause 
and which for the wrong."5
From their view that the struggle between *Ali and Mu*awiyah 
should have been left to God to make a decision on the Day 
of Judgement comes their name 'Murji'ites', which means 
the "those who postpone".
These three groups may be regarded as the begin­
ning of divisions among Muslims. They emerged due to the 
political differences, but, in maintaining their political 
positions, they employed theological arguments to add sup­
port to their claim. This in turn brought about theologi­
cal differences.
These three groups gained many followers and 
scholars. What is significant for the purpose of our pre­
sent study is the group of Kharijites and Murji'ites.
"The Kharij ite position contains the germ of the leading
5. Ibid., p. 669.
idea of the Qadarites, |[who^  were the heralds of the Mu*-
tazilites."^ As for the murji'ite group, "They were to
7a great extent the forerunners of orthodoxy." According 
to al-Ash‘ari, Jahm b. Safwan, the great determinist and 
his followers belonged in the group of the Murji'iteso^ 
They were called the pure 'Jabarites*©
Mu*tazilites is the name given to a group of 
theologians who were also called 'the Seceders'. The exis­
tence of this school, in its first development is not pure­
ly political. However, their theological arguments were 
used to justify the political ends of rulers or to refute 
those who were opposed to the rulers, especially during 
the reign of the Abbasid caliphs. With regard to the pro­
blem of a Muslim who committed a sin, they held the middle 
position between the Kharijites and the Murji’ites. They 
said: "A sinful Muslim was neither a believer nor an un-
9
believer, but one in the middling state." This was the 
position of Wasil b. *Ata' (died 748 A.D) as he presented
6. A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, (London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1932), p. 37.
7. W. M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination In Early 
Islam, (London, Luzac & Company Ltd, 1948), p. 42.
8o Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-Mus-
allin. Vol. 1., Edited by Hellmut Ritter, (Istanbul, 
1929), p. 132.
9. Abu'l A ‘la Maudoodi, op cit., p. 671.
it to his master, Hasan al-Basri. Hasan al-Basri was an 
outstanding theologian and scholar of that time, but Wasil 
b. A^ta* disagreed with him regarding the problem of the 
Muslim who had committed grave sin. Therefore, Wasil-broke 
away from Hasan al-Basri and established his own position. 
These two positions, then form the basis of the Mu *tazilites, 
The name 'Mu‘tazilite' was the name given to them by others© 
They called themselves as *ahl al-TawhId wa'l-'adl' (The 
People of Unity and Justice), for the following reasons:
"By justice they imply that it is incumbent on God 
to requite the obedient for their good deeds and 
punish the sinners for their misdeeds. By unity 
they imply the denial of the divine attributes."10
Based on these two theses, the Mu‘tazilites developed their 
system of theological interpretation. In contrast to the 
orthodox method, the Mu*tazilites relied more on reason 
than revelation© They used reason to justify revelation.
Historically, this school was very popular in 
teh reign of the Abbasid caliphs, especially under the 
reign of Ma'mun (died 833 A.D), who introduced Greek phi­
losophy into Islam by his initiative in the translation 
movement. During his reign, he encouraged translators to
10. Mir Valiuddin, 'Mu*tazilism', in A History of Muslim
Philosophy, Vol. 1., edited by M.M. Sharif, (Weisbaden, 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), pp© 199 - 219 (p. 200).
translate Greek works into Arabic. He was the famous 
Abbasid caliph in the intellectual movement during this 
dynasty and he also set up an academy called 'Bayt al- 
Hikma' (House of Wisdom) in 830 A.D. With regard to his 
attitude toward the theological schools of his day, it is 
reported that he was a supporter of the Mu*tazilites.
"In fact, it was perhaps his very interest in 
theological discussions that led by degrees 
to not only the promotion of a popular interest 
in theology, but also to the support of the 
cause of a theological party (the Mu*tazilite) 
that had sought to apply the categories of 
Greek thought to Muslim dogmas and the use of 
the decisive resources of the state in the de­
fense and consolidation of this position."11
The Mu*tazilites employed Greek philosophy to 
produce a highly rational form of theology. While this 
gained for them the support of the Abbasid caliphs and 
the people at large, the orthodox school of Muslims re­
garded them as heretics©
Before proceeding to the main discussion of the 
problem of Free Will and Predestination we shall give a 
short introduction to al-Ash*ari's life and his writings. 
During his youth, al-Ash* ari was a pupil of his stepfather 
al-Jubba’i (died 915 A.D), who was a leader of the Mu*ta-
11. M. Fakhry, op cit., p. 23,
zilites. But in 912 A.D, when he was forty, al-Ash*ari 
suddenly abandoned the camp of the Mu‘tazilite, especially 
the teaching of al-Jubba*i. This sudden change is reported 
to have occurred when al-Ash*ari went to the Mosque of Bas­
rah and declared:'
"He who knows me, knows me; and he who knows me not, 
let him know that I am so and so, the son of so 
and so. I have maintained the creation of the 
Qur'an and that God will not be seen in the world 
to come with the eyes, and that creatures create 
their actions. Lo, I repent that I have been a 
Mu*tazilite and turn to opposition to them ©"12
This historical event is said to have come about 
for one of two reasons. Firstly, the change took place 
after he had some directions in his dreams. Secondly, his 
disagreement with the answer given by his master, al-Jubba'i, 
regarding the problem of faith and reward in the life here­
after.
As to the first cause, it is reported that one 
night in the month of Ramadan, the Prophet appeared to him 
ti :ee times in his dream. The Prophet asked him to seek 
truth in al-Qur'an and the Traditions rather than his vain 
kalam© Such a story would be regarded as legend by modern
12o D. B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, 
Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, (bondon, 
George Routledge & Sons Limited, 1903), p. 188.
scholars, but it is a traditional device of ancient Arab 
historians to use a dream to mark a dramatic turning point. 
For example, there is a story of the dream of al-Ma'mun, 
the Abbasid caliph, in which Aristotle appeared to al-Ma'­
mun and discussed’ the problem of good and the nature of 
Godo The similarity of these two stories is quite obvious, 
though fortunately to investigate the truth of these sto­
ries lies outside the field of our discussion© But what 
is more significant is that the change in al-Ash‘ari marked 
the turning point in the history of Islamic thought. The 
second report of this change which is of more interest is 
that al-Ash*ari debated with his master, al-Jubba'i con­
cerning the problem of three brothers who are in different 
positions; the first one was a believer, the second was a 
unbeliever and the third one died as a child. The question 
concerns the status of these three brothers in the life here­
after. Al-Jubba'i replied that the believer was in heaven, 
the unbeliever in hell and the child in a place of safety. 
Then another question was asked by al-Ash*ari of al-Jubba'i:
"But if the third said, 'Lord, Thou mightest have 
granted me life, and then I would have been pious 
and entered Paradise like my brother-,* what then?". 
Al-Jubba'i replied, 'God would say, knew that 
if thou wert granted life thou wouldst be godless 
and unbelieving and enter Hell*. Then al-Ash*ari 
drew his noose, 'But what if the second said,
'Lord, why didst thou not make me die as a child?
Then had I escaped Hell'. Al-Jubba'i was silenced,
10
and al-Ash*ari went away in triumph."13
This story, however, is somewhat similar to the story of 
the change which happened to Wasil b. *Ata' the founder 
of the Mu*tazilite school. Wasil asked Hasan al-Basri 
about the problem of the grave sinner. Hasan al-Basri 
failed to give a satisfactory answer to the question and 
Wasil left the teaching of Hasan al-Basri, that is the 
early orthodox, and formed his position which later be­
came known as the Mu*tazilite.
After this change, al-Ash*ari wrote many books 
in order to develop his orthodox middle path position, 
using philosophical arguments confirmed by proof from 
passages of a -Qur'an and the Traditions. As the hammer 
of the Mu^tazilites, he used rational arguments as a weapon 
to condemn the Mu*tazilite position. According to the an­
cient authorities, the works of al-Ash*ari numbered nearly 
three hundred. "After the change he wrote a number of books
and Ibn Furak says that the number amounted to three hun—
—
dred. Ibn Asakir Dimashqi has given the titles of ninety- 
14three of them ©" W. C. Klein stated that: "a number
13© Ibid., pp. 189 - 190.
14© M. Abdul Hye, 'Ash*arism*, in A History of Muslim 
Philosophy, Vol. 1, edited by M.M. Sharif (Weista- 
den, Qtto Harrazzowitz, 1963), pp. 220 - 243,
(p._ 223).
11
given by several authorities is fifty-five© The Fihrist
15 . iassigns him only six." The following works of al—Ash —
ari are given by W. C. Klein. (1) Maqalat a1—1s1amiyin 
Wa' khtilaf al-Musallln© In this work, al-Ash*ari dis­
cussed the hereditary of the different schools, the or­
thodox creed as well as different views on philosophical 
question. (2) Kitab al-Luma*, translated as 'Book of 
Aphorism*. There are ten chapters in this work dealing 
respectively the Qur'an, God's Will, His Visibility, The 
Qadar, the Istita*a (Capacity), The Ta‘dli and Tajwlr 
( Accounting just and accounting unjust ), Faith, The 
Particular and The Universe, The Promise and The Threat, 
and The Imamate. (3) Ibâna *An Usui al-Diyana, transla­
ted as 'The Elucidation of Islam's foundation*. (4) Ri- 
sala Fi'istihsan al-Khawd Fl'l-Kalam, translated as 'Tract 
in Favour of The Free Use Of The Kalam?. (5) Risala al— 
Iman, translated as “The Tract of Faith*. This work is 
used to defend the uncreatedness of fatih. (6) Risala 
Kataba biha ila Ahl at—Tajr Bi Bab al—Abwad. (7) Qawl 
Jumlat Ashab al-Hadith Wa ahl-Sunnah Fi'1-i*tiqad.
The First three are employed in our present study espe-
15. W.C. Klein, In his introduction to his translation 
of Al-Ash*ari's Ibana *An Usui al-Diyana, (New Ha­
ven, Connecticut, American Oriental Society, 1940),
po 28.
16© Ibid., pp. 29 - 30,
12
daily with regard to his philosophical arguments.
As an orthodox philosophical theologian, al- 
Ash*ari makes use of both orthodox kalam and dialectical 
method. He used -the former in order to oppose the ra­
tionalist Mu*tazilites and he used the dialectic method 
to oppose the extreme Traditionists or the early orthodox. 
For this reason, he was the most distinguished and dis­
tinctive scholar of his time© With regard to his attitude 
towards the two extreme positions, that is the Mu^tazilites 
and the early orthodox or Traditionists, al-Ash*ari is re­
ported to have had a close relationship to the e.arly or­
thodox. In the following paragraphs we shall illustrate 
this. Acceding to al-Shahrastani's account elaborated"by 
G. Makdisi, al-Ash*ari's position regarding the problem of 
the divine attributes is similar to the position of one sec­
tion of the early orthodox.
As far as the problem of divine attributes is 
concerned, there were two extreme positions before al-Ash*- 
ari. The firstris the Mu*tazilite position which disasso­
ciated God from any attributes. Their position was then 
called ’ta*til* (divesting). The second position:.is that 
of the early orthodox who held a doctrine of the divine 
attributes. They were then called the ’Sifatites’ (Attri-
13
butists). Among the early orthodox there was a section 
who had an anthropomorphic conception of the divine attri­
butes. They were called the "Mushabbihin (Comparers)",
It is clear that there was a wide divergence between the 
Mu^tazilites, the’upholders of the concept of *ta*til' 
(divesting) and the upholders of 'tashbih' (comparison) 
which held divine attributes in their human forms© Bet­
ween these two extreme positions, there came another group 
of early orthodox, who were then called the middle path 
orthodox. This group believed in the concept of the di­
vine attributes but not in the idea of 'tashbih* (compa­
rison)© They affirmed the divine attributes by the con­
cept of * tafwid“ (leaving the interpretation to God).
This means that they accept the divine attributes as 
found in al-Qur'an and leave their interpretation to God. 
This according to al-Shahrastani is the position of al- 
Ash*ari. He was following the orthodox middle path po­
sition, as exemplified by Malik b. Anas and Ibn Hanbal.
'Tafwid * is one of al-Ash*ari's position. The other one, 
according to al-Shahrastani, is that of 'ta'wil' (Meta­
phorical interpretation). For this reason, it is quite 
clear that al-Ash*ari follows two different roads: the
first road was called the 'road of salvation*, which is 
closely related to the early orthodox and secondly the 
'road of wisdom*, which is more philosophical and uses
14
rational argumentation, ^oth methods are employed by al-
- 17Ash ari in his theological works.
The aim of this study is to describe al-Ash*ari’s 
philosophical arguments which have been so influential 
in the history of Islamic thought, especially regarding 
the question of Free Will and Predestination© Since this 
present study is a philosophical work, we shall pay more 
attention to the 'road of wisdom’ (tariq al-Hikma) rather 
than the 'road of salvation' Ctariq al-Salama), The road 
of wisdom is regarded as his philosophical method in sol­
ving religious problems, whereas the road of salvation is 
regarded as his dogmatic method©
The problem of Free Will and Predestination is 
said to have been the first controversial issue to occur 
in Islamic thought. It was first discussed as the works 
of Ma*bad al-Juhani (died 699 A.D), Ghailan al-Dimashql 
(died before 743 A.D), Wasil b. *Ata' (died 748 A.D)©
It is not our purpose to investigate the origins of the 
problem of Free Will and Predestination, for much has 
been said by modern scholars to this subject. There is,
17. G. Makdisi, "Ash*ari and The Ash**arites In Islamic 
Religious History," 1., STUDIA ISLAMICA, Vol. 17, 
(1962), pp. 51 - 52.
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for example, the excellent research of Prof. W. M. Watt 
especially in his treatment of political interference in­
to the development of this problem. What is of interest 
here is to examine the fundamental differences among the 
schools with whom al-Ash^ari carried on his debateso This, 
however, will lead to study of different sects as Well as 
individual scholars among whom the controversies have flou­
rished.
Muslim scholars are unanimous that any interpre­
tation of theological as well as philosophical problems 
must refer to al-Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet. 
Or at least, it must not go against positions which are 
plainly stated in these sacred sources. The problem of 
Free Will and Predestination is regarded as a theological 
and philosophical one, and therefore, it must be discussed 
within the context of al-Qur'an and the Traditionso How­
ever, with reference to the passages in al-Qur'an, there 
are many passages which firmly maintain the omnipotence 
of God and the sovereignty of God in the universe. There 
are also several passages which clearly state that man is 
free with respect to his own deeds. For this reason, it 
is clear that in al-Qur'an there is nothing definite to 
suggest any philosophical doctrine on this subject. This 
does not mean that al-Qur'an does not deal with this prob-
16
lemo Ai_Qur'an has given the general answer to this prob­
lem, although the answer still reguires interpretation.
With regard to the statement of God * s absolute 
power and sovereignty in the universe, al-Qur'an stated:
"That is God, your Lord!
There is no god but He,
The Creator of all things :
Then worship ye Him:
And He hath power
To dispose of all affairs." (6 : 102)
"There is no moving creature 
On earth but its sustenance 
Dependeth on God: He knoweth
The time and space and its 
Temporal deposit:
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All is in a clear Recordo" (11 : 6)19
These passages concern the power of God towards His crea­
tures in the universe. They describe His sovereignty over 
all the creatures in the universe and as such are not of 
our concern. But, with regard to God's power over human 
actions, which was soon to be a controversial issue in 
Islam, there are statements or passages in al-Qur'an sup­
porting contradictory positions. Firstly, there are pas­
sages which affirm absolute predestination:
18o All quotation are taken from the translation by A, 
Yusuf A^li, The Glorious Qur'an, Translation and 
Commentary, (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 
1978), p. 319.
19. Ibid., p. 515.
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"No soul can^believe, except 
By the Will of God,
And He will place Doubt
(Or obscurity) on those „
Who will not understand." (10 : 100)
"Those whom God (in His Plan)
Willeth to guide,— He openeth 
Their breast to îslam;
Those whom He willeth
To leave straying, —  He maketh
Their breath close and constricted," (6 : 125)
Secondly there are passages which affirm complete freedom 
of human actions:
"Say, 'The Truth is 
From your Lord':
Let him who will,
Believe, and let him
Who will, rejecto" (18 : 29)
"It is those who believe not 
In the signs of God,
That forge falsehood;
It is they who lie!" (16 : 105)
Despite the fact that al-Qur'an gives no definite answer 
to the problem of Free Will and Predestination, there are 
several passages of the Traditions of the Prophet which 
favour predestination. Among those are:
"God wrote down the decrees, regarding the created 
world fifty thousand years before He created the 
heavans and the earth, while His throne was on
20. Ibid., p. 510.
21. Ibid., p. 326.
22o Ibid., p. 738.
23. Ibid., p. 685o
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24the water."
"The Prophet said: Verily, one of you is gathered
together in his mother's womb forty days, then 
he is a clot of blood the same time, then an an­
gel is sent to him and four things are ordained: 
his sustenance, his term, whether he ia to be ' 
miserable or happy (and his work)."25
The Qur'anic passages and the Traditions which 
refer to predestination are sometimes interpreted as ex­
pounding a fatalistic position. And yet there are clear 
references in al-Qur'an and Traditions in favour of the 
freedom of human actions and the reward and punishments 
of man in the life hereafter. For these resons, the prob­
lem remained as a controversial issue in Islamic theology. 
During the lifetime of the Prophet Muslims were discouraged 
from discussing this problem and asked to spend their time 
in the practical teaching of religion. The Prophet clear­
ly disapproved of such debates*
As history went on, the problem became a major 
area of discussion among the different schools as well as 
individuals in Islamic thought. Among those were the two 
extremes of the Mu*tazilites and the determinists or com-
24o Muslim, Qadar, Tradition 16, quoted from A. J. Wen- 
sinck, Muslim Creed, p. 54.
25. Al-Bukhari, Qadar, b. 1, trad. 1 quoted frcm W. M- 
Watt, Free Will and Predestination In Early Islam,
p . 18 .
19
pulsionists, often called in Islam the Jabarites* The 
Mu^tazilites are the upholders of the doctrine of Free 
Will which depends on the establishment of the justice 
of God. On the other hand, the Jabarites are the up­
holders of the doctrine of Predestination* The word 
'Jabarite' is not the name of a school but the name of 
the person who maintains the absolute preordination of 
human actions. The Jabarite position is to maintain 
the absolute sovereignty and omnipotence of God in the 
universe.
As has been mentioned before the Mu^tazilites 
were the forerunners of the Qadarites who also had a 
close relationship with the Kharij ites in the matter of 
ideas. The Mu^tazilites imported philosophical argumen­
tation into their doctrines, especially frcm Greek works 
which were made available to them through the translation 
movement. The Jabarites, in contrast to the Mu* tazilites 
held that human actions are predestinated by God. One of 
the most popular scholars of this group was Jahm b. Safwan 
(died 745 A.D), and his followers were called the Jahmites.
c - 26In'al-Ash ari's work, Jahm was classified as 'Murji'ite'.
26. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-Musal- 
lrn,Vol. 1., p. 132,
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Regarding the term 'Jabarite', al-Shahrastani reported
that:
"Compulsion (jabr) is the denial that actions 
really come from man, and the attribution of 
them to God. The Jabariya consist of several 
groups. The pure Jabariya are those who do 
not assert any act at all to be man's or any 
power for action. The moderate Jabariya as- • 
sert that man has a power which does not have 
any influence at all."27
As far as Jahm's doctrine is concerned, he was regarded
as a pure Jabarite, believing that all human action is
28determined by God.
In 912 A.D. al-Ash*ari separated from the Mu*- 
tazilites and emerged in the orthodox middle path position 
trying to reconcile the conflict between the positions of 
the Mu*tazilites and the Jabarites* Though al-Ash* ari 
also dealt with the position of the Jabarite, we shall not 
be concerned with it in this study. We shall discuss his 
reply to the Mu^tazilites where he used philosophical ar­
guments as weapons against them*
27. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal Wa'1-Nihal, Vol. 1., 
quoted from W. M-. Watt,' Free- Wiii- -and Predestination 
In Early Islam, p. 96*
28. M. Abdul Hye, op cit., p. 226.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.
The questions relating to God's attributes and 
His unity are regarded as controversial areas in Islamic 
theology* Indeed, these problems of the relationship bet­
ween God’s attributes and God’s absolute unity became one 
of the main theological and philosophical issues in early 
Islam*
This problem becomes more complicated when We 
consider the references in al-Qur'an to the attributes and 
the oneness of God, The following are some translations 
of the great many verses regarding these two questions* 
Firstly, verses which describe the attributes of God:
22
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"Send not away those 
Who call on their Lord 
Morning and evening,
Seeking His face." (6 : 52)
"Say: 'Who is it in whose
Hands is the governance 
Of all Things, —  who protects 
(All), but is not protected 
(Of any)? (Say) if ye know." (23 : 88)
"Throw -( the child)
Into the chest,' and throw 
(the chest) into the river:
The river will cast him 
Up on the bank, and he 
Will be taken up by one 
Who is- an enemy to Me 
And an enemy to him':
But I cast ( the garment 
Of) love over thee from Me:
And (this) in order that 
Thou mayest be reared _
Under Mine eye." (20 : 39)
The first verse is speaking of God's face, the 
second is of God's hand the third verse refers to the eye 
of God. These are among a number of verses which are re­
garded as illustrating a pure anthropomorphic concept of 
God. These anthropomorphic attributes can be described 
as 'physical', and are not of interest in this present
1. All quotations are taken from the translation by A?
Yusuf *Ali, The Glorious Qur'an: Translation and
Commentary, (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 
1978), po 302.
2, Ibid., p. 889o
3« Ibido, p. 796.
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study* What we are much more concerned with is the attri­
bute which is regarded as that of 'quality'. To illustrate 
we may quote several translations of al-Qur'an mentioning 
these attributes:
"Say: 'Whether ye hide
What is in your hearts 
Or reveal it,
He knows what is all:
He knows what is 
In the heavens,
And what is on earth.
And God has power
Over all things." (3 : 29)
"God! There is no god 
But He, —  the Living,
The Self-subsisting, Eternal.
No slumber can seize Him 
Nor sleep." (2 : 255)5
"No soul can believe, except 
By the Will of God,
And He will place Doubt 
(Or obscurity) on those 
Who will not understand." (10 : 100)
"Offspring, one of the other:
And God heareth
And knoweth all things." (3 : 34)
"If they do, they are in right guidance.
But if they turn back,
Thy duty is to convey the message:
And in God's sight
Are (all) His servants." (3 : 20)
4. Ibid., p. 130.
5. Ibid , p. 102.
6. Ibid., p. 510.
7. Ibid., p. 131.
8. Ibid., p. 12.7.
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Based on these verses, early theologians interpreted the 
attributes of God and divided into different sects and 
schools- We shall not be concerned with the problem of 
the attributes of God in general, or the interpretation 
of these verses, because this would lead into a broad 
field of study which would be outside the area of our 
discussion. For the purpose of our present study we 
shall concentrate on the problem of the knowledge of God,
Despite the fact that al-Qur'an proclaims the 
many attributes of God, there are several passages which 
firmly proclaim the concept of the unity of God and the 
oneness of God, as in the translations below:
"Say: He is God,
The One and Only;
God the Eternal, Absolute;
He begetheth not,
Nor is He begotten;
And there is none
Like unto Him." (122 : 1-4)
"And your God 
Is One God :
There is no god 
But He,
Most Gracious,
Most Merciful." (2 : 163)10
The unity of God has been the earliest and most
9. Ibid., p. 1806.
10. Ibid., pp. 63 - 64o
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fundamental issue in Islamic thought* The concern has 
been to maintain the monotheistic conception of God which 
displaced polytheistic and henotheistic conceptions of 
Arab paganism, often referred to as 'the age of Jahiliyya 
(Ignorance)'. From this arose several problems. For 
example, if these attributes or qualities are regarded 
as parts of God, does that not involve a return to a po­
lytheistic conception or is it inconsistent with the con­
cept of the Unity of God?* For such reasons some of the 
Mu*tazilites and other sects of theologians denied the 
divine attributes in order to maintain the Unity of God.
The Mu*tazilites are those who were regarded as divesting 
God of all essential attributes and proclaimed themselves 
as "ahl al-Tawhid" (People of Unity), This problem will 
be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Al-Ash* ari agreed with all Muslim scholars that, 
according to al-Qur'an, "God knows"* However, its question 
of how this should be interpreted remains. In al-Ash*ari's 
philosophical discussions of the knowledge of God and its 
relation to God's essence, the following questions were 
dealt with. If God really knows, is His knowledge eternal 
or created?. If it is eternal, does He know through His 
essence which is He?. The first question is the question 
about the nature of God's knowledge, whether it is eternal
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or created. Whereas, the second question is the most sig­
nificant question, for it describes the nature of that know­
ledge as well as its relation to the essence of God Himself. 
Fran these questions, lead a great many inquiries. Al-Ash*- 
ari dealt with these questions with orthodox middle path 
attitudes which will be clearly seen at the end of this 
chapter.
1. The Eternity Of The Knowledge Of God.
Al-Ash^ari believed in the eternity of the know­
ledge of God. ^t is not created as the compulsidhist Jahm 
b. Safwan (died 746 A.D) and his followers (the Jahmites) 
claimed. Jahm b. Safwan died in 746 A.D., but the Jahmites 
were very active in the time of al-Ash** ari. For this reason, 
in his discussion of the uncreatedness of the words of God 
(al-Qur'an) entitled 'Kalam on the doctrine That the Qur'- 
an is the Uncreated Word of God' in his work Al-Ibana An 
Usui al-Diyana, there are two sections containing his reply 
to the Jahmiyya (Jahmites). This was in addition to his 
criticism of the Mu*tazilites, but in this section we shall
llo Al-Ash*ari, Al-Ibana *An Usui al-Diyana, translated
by W. C. Klein, American Oriental Series, Vol. 19, 
(New Haven, Connecticut, 1940), pp. 73 - 75.
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deal with Jahm’s arguments of the createdness of the know­
ledge of God and al-Ash*ari's reply to them.
Firstly, Jahm ^escribéd the relationship of 
God, His knowledge and all things known to Him. It is re­
ported as follows:
"God cannot know ot£ things before He has actually 
created them. In other words, He knows them 
after He has created them."12
The reason he put forward is that, if God knew things be­
fore He created them, it would entail the supposition that 
His knowledge of the things would either, (a) remain as 
it was before the creation of the things, or (b) it would 
not remain the same. If (a) is the case, it is impossible, 
because the knowledge of things before their existence is 
distinct from the knowledge of them_after' their‘existence. 
If (b) is the case, then the knowledge of God must be va­
riable, in the sense that His knowledge of things before 
they exist is different from the knowledge of these same 
things after they exist* This is certainly true because 
whatever is variable must be changeable. And if it is 
changeable, it cannot be eternal. Both suppositions (a) 
and (b) lead to the conclusion that God's knowledge is
12. Abdul Subhan, 'Al-Jahm b. Safwan and His Philosophy' 
ISLAMIC CULTURE, Vol. 11.,‘(1937), p. 224.
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not eternal, but is created*
The second argument of Jahm is concerned with 
the relationship between God's knowledge and His essence, 
It is an elaboration of supposition (a) from the first 
argument* He said:
"God's knowledge does not precede phenomena because 
that would imply change in Him, because knowing 
that a thing will be is different from knowing 
that it is. There is one knowledge for every 
knowable."13
Al-Shahrastani's account of Jahm b. Safwan and Hisham b. 
Hakam is that:
"They agreed that God knows eternally what will 
be, and knowledge about the future is not the 
same'as knowledge about the present."14
From these two statements, it can be concluded that, since 
God is regarded as the creator of things as they are, and 
since these things are changeable, according to Jahm, God 
knows things after they have been created. This is to es­
tablish the absoluteness and the uniqueness of God. This 
would follow the same conclusion as for the first argument 
that is, God's knowledge is created.
13* A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, (London, Luzac & 
Company Ltd., 1947), pp. 63 - 64.
14. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l- 
Kalam, edited and translated by Alfred Guillaume, 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 78.
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Now, we proceed to analyse al-Ash*ari's reply 
to Jahm's positions or rather the Jahmites' positions. 
Al-Ash*ari maintained that God's knowledge is eternal 
and he set out to prove that both of Jahm's arguments 
are false. To begin with, al-Ash*ari makes clear that 
the eternity of God's knowledge was affirmed by all Mus­
lims and to deny this would be regarded as a departure 
from this general agreement. This is not a philosophi­
cal argument, but rather an accusation against the Jahmi­
tes.
Al-Ash* ari said :
"The Muslims unanimously agreed, before the origin 
of the Jahmiyyah and the Mu*tazilah and the Haru- 
riyyah, that God had knowledge eternally, and 
said: 'God's knowledge is eternal, for God's
knowledge precedes created things' and they do 
not refuse to say of every new thing that arises 
and everything that comes down from God, 'All 
this exists antecendently in God's knowledge;' 
and therefore he who denies that God has know­
ledge dissents from the Muslims and is guilty 
of a departure from their agreement."15
This statement of al-Ash*ari is in agreement with the po­
sition of the Early Orthodox. In Fikh Akhbar 11 by Abu 
Hanifa (died 767 A.D) a contemporary of Jahm b. Safwan, 
it is stated that:
15, Al-Ash^ari, Al-Ibana An Usui al-Diyana, p. 95.
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"He has been from eternity and will be to eternity 
with His qualities and His names. None of His 
qualities or names has come into being; frcm 
eternity He knows by virtue of His knowledge, 
knowledge being an eternal quality."16
This is also an accusation rather than an argument. It 
is obvious that here al-Ash*ari is expressing his orthodox 
attitude to the problem.
Moreover al-Ash*ari accused the Jahmites of 
borrowing their position from non-Islamic sources, namely 
'the zindiq'. He made this accusation because, according 
to al-Ash*ari, their position in maintaining the created­
ness of God's knowledge would entail that God has no know­
ledge before the thing is created. And, since God is eter­
nal and knowledge is created, therefore the proposition 
that 'God is knowing' is impossible.
"They have simply borrowed this from the 'zindiqs' 
and the advocates of 'ta^til'; because many of 
the 'zindiqs' believe that God is not a knower, 
or a wielder of power, or a living one, or hear­
ing one, or a seeing one".17
Concerning the proposition of the first argument 
of Jahm, that is, God knows things after He creates them,
16. Quoted by A.J. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 188.
17o Al-Ash*ari, Al-Ibana *An Usui al-Diyana, p. 94.
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follows another proposition that is ’God originates know­
ledge for Himself. This, according to al-Shahrastani’s 
account of the orthodox argument, in replying to Jahm's 
theory is totally unthinkable. If God originates know­
ledge for Himself, then either: i.(a) it must be in.His
essence, or (b) in a substrate, iio not in either. More­
over, he clarified that:
"Origination essentially demands alteration; and 
origination in a substrate would demand that the 
substrate should be of time; while origination 
not in a substrate would demand the denial of 
God's specifying."18
From this reply, it is reasonable to assume that the idea 
'God originates knowledge for Himself is unthinkable.
Another proposition derived from Jahm's theory 
is that, if God knows things after He creates them, that 
is, 'God's knowledge is like human knowledge', then God 
knows things after they existo Al-Ash*ari's general ar­
gument that 'God is unlike a creature' throws light on 
his reply to Jahm's position. It is to presume that if 
God were like a creature, it would follow that His rela­
tion to temporal production would be that of a creature.
18. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'l-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l- 
Kalam, p. 78.
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If God were like a creature, it would lead to the following 
alternatives: God would be like a creature either: (a)
in all respects, or (b) in some respects. If (a) is the 
case, it would entail that He be temporally produced, as 
a creature is, in-all respectso If (b) is the case, God 
would be temporally produced, in that there are some res­
pects in which He is like a creature and some in which He 
is noto Both alternatives are equally impossible to pre­
sume of God, since God is eternal but creatures are tem­
poral either in all respects or in some respectso Al~Ash*ri 
concluded :
"But it is impossible for the temporally produced 
to have preexisted eternally."19
Referring to this argument, there are good grounds for main­
taining that God's knowledge is eternal, and it pre-exists 
eternally. And to hold that God knows things after He 
creates them is unreasonable.
The second argument of Jahm is closely related 
to the first one: If God's knowledge is eternal, it must
follows that God knows in the past, present and future, 
since things before they exist are different from them-
19. A1-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, translated by Richard 
J. Me Carthy, in The theology of Al-Ash*ari. 
(Beyrouth, Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), p. 9.
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selves after they exist. So, the different forms of the 
knowable in a different state of time or situation of 
the knowlable would entail that God's knowledge will 
change as the knowable changes. And if it is eternal, 
it is impossible to change. Therefore, according to Jahm, 
God's knowledge is created.
Since this was the object of Jahm's position, 
al-Ash* ari produced the counter argument to this claim. 
Al-Ash* ari's reply was reported by al-Shahrastani, as fol­
lows :
"The way in which they differ is nothing to do with 
knowledge about them, but is peculiar to themselves, 
They are known because knowledge comes into contact 
with them but that does not alter."20
Since it has been agreed that God is eternal, which is a 
state regarded as timeless, the changing of the thing know- 
able, that is, the thing in eternity and afterwards created, 
does not affect His essence.
Furthermore, considering the new cognition pre­
cedes from the thing as it exists he claimed:
"Are these new cognitions knowable before they come
20. Al-Shahrastani, Ki'ab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l-
Kalam, po 79.
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into existence, or are they not an object of know­
ledge?. If they were knowable was it by eternal 
knowledge and cognitive power, or by other cogni­
tions which preceded their existence?o"21
These two alternatives are produced in order to clarify 
their claim regarding the new cognition of a knowableo 
This is a conclusion which can be drawn from Jahm’s ar­
gument of the changeableness of the knowable. The first 
alternative would mean that everything is known by eter­
nal knowledge and this would also follow from Jahm's 
answer about the new cognition. The second alternative 
is certain to be impossible, because it would entail that 
those cognitions need further cognitions and result end­
less chain (tasasul).
From these discussions, it is concluded that,,■ 
dccoi ,ing to al-Ash*ari, the knowledge of God is eternal, 
for God knows the things before He creates them. And be­
cause God's knowledge is eternal and is not affected by 
the changing of time and of things that exist, therefore 
it is false to believe that God's knowledge is created.
It is eternal. Since it is eternal, it is to be believed 
that God knows the past, present and the future. In re­
lation to the main problem of this study, that is the
2lo Ibid., pp. 79 - 80.
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problem of Free Will and Predestination, a question arises,
I
Since God has foreknowledge of human action, the question 
therefore arises: what is man's responsibility for acts
which were determined in God's knowledge?. This question 
will be answered later.
2, The Eternity Of The Knowledge Of God And Its 
Relation With His Essence.
It has been already argued, in the previous sec­
tion, that the knowledge of God is eternal. And it has 
been said before, that God Himself is eternal. The problem 
is, how are these two eternities to be related, that is, 
how is the eternity of the knowledge of God to be related 
to God Himself?. The following questions serve to show how 
this problem has been dealt with by the Mu*tazilites and 
al-Ash*ari's comments on their views.
Firstly, if God's knowledge is eternal, does 
He know through Himself, is this knowledge part of Himself?. 
Secondly, if God's knowledge is eternal, is it predicated 
of God simply to assert His being and to deny His ignorance?, 
These two questions were central to the thought of two lead­
ing scholars of the Mu*tazilites. The first question is 
identified with the position of Abu'1-Hudhail al-Allaf
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(died 841 A.D) one of the famous scholar of Basrite school 
of Mu^tazilites. Whereas the second question is identified 
with the position of al-Nazzam (died 840 A.D) who during 
his youth associated with philosophers, dualists and-mate- 
rualists as well as sceptics. Both of them influenced the 
contemporaries of al-Ash*ari, that is, al-Jubba'i and his 
son, Abu Hashimo
Regarding Abu'1-Hudhail's position, al-Shahras- 
tani reported that he was following the philosophers' con­
ception of the knowledge of God. He stated:
"Abu'1-Hudhail al-*Allaf followed the philosophers 
in holding that God knows by knowledge which is 
Himself (nafsuhu)o"22
Regarding al-Nazzam's position, al-Ash*ari mentioned that:
"He denies knowledge, power, life, hearing, seeing, 
and i^ other^  essential attributes ^of God] and 
says that God is continuously knowing, living 
powerful, hearing and eternal in virtue of him­
self (bi-nafsihi), but not.in virtue of knowledge, 
power, life, hearing, seeing, and eternity, and 
so is his view with regard to jother] essential 
attributes."23
22. Ibid., p. 69
23. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin, Vol. 2., p. 486, 
quoted from Harry A. Wolfson, "Philosophical impli­
cations of the Problem of Divine Attributes", 
JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY, Vol. 79,
No. 2, (1959), pp. 73 - 80 (p. 76)
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Referring to Abu'1-Hudhail's position, it is 
obvious that he is in favour of maintaining the simplicity 
as well as the absoluteness of God* God’s qualities must 
be regarded as either negations or logical references or 
relations. Because of His absolute simplicity, nothing 
positive could be said about God since then there would 
be added subject' and predicate quality and being to Him. 
However God is not to be regarded as composite.
According to the report of al-Shahrastani quoted
before, it is obvious that Abu’1-Hudhail was influenced by
the philosophers in his conception of divine attributes.
If we investigate in detail al-Nazzam’s position, then we
can conclude that his position is also influenced by the
philosopherso This claim is substantiated by H. A. Wolf-
son who established that both al-Nazzam and Abu'1-Hudhail
24were influenced by Aristotleo
The phrase which indicates the relationship bet­
ween the Mu*tazilites* (al-Nazzam and Abu'1-Hudhail) posi­
tion and Aristotle's is 'which is Himself, which both 
al-Nazzam and Abu'l-Hudhail used although they differed 
in their positions — Abu'1-Hudhail saying that 'God knows 
by Himself'(in virtue of Himself), whereas al-Nazzam denied
24o Ibid., pp. 77 - 78.
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it, saying that God knows not in virtue of knowledge. 
Thus H. A. Wolfson pointed out that;
"The Arabic expression 'li-nafsihi' or 'bi-nafsihi', 
which we have translated 'in virtue of Himself is 
a direct translation of the Greek* Kct0* cxy 
which means' 'according to himself, 'by himself 
or 'in virtue of himself ,"25
To make clear Aristotle's position on this subject, H. A. 
Wolfson summarised Aristotle's meaning of the phrase quoted 
above in three alternatives:
"(1) that which is the definition of the subject, 
thus signifying its essence, or (2) that which 
is its genus and differentiae, or (3) that which 
is its property."26
Although Abu'1-Hudhail and al-Nazzam differ in
f *
this matter, they still used the characteristic phrase,
'in virtue of. In this regard, H. A. Wolfson stated that;
"Accordingly, when both al-Nazzam and Abu'1-Hudhail 
describe divine attributes as’terms predicated of 
God 'in virtue of himself, they mean thereby that 
each of these terms signifies a property of God."27
25. Ibid., p. 77.
26. Ibid., p. 77. See also, Aristotle, The Works of Aris­
totle, Vol.'VIII., Metaphysicaç Translated into English 
under the editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. RosSo
(Dxford, the Clarendon Press, 1908). Book V, Chapter
18, 1022ao
27. Ibid., p. 77.
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However, with regard to the question of any predicate 
of God, for example the predicate 'knowing', signifying 
a property of God, they have different interpretations.
If we are to assume that both of these scholars 
were influenced by the Metaphysics of Aristotle, we have 
to examine the translation movement in the history of Is­
lamic thought. Ishaq b. Hunain (died 911 A.D), a famous 
Muslim translator of Greek works, is said to have trans­
lated into Arabic the following texts:
"The 'Categories', the 'Hermeneutics', 'De Genera- 
tione' et Corruptione' , the 'Ethics' in Porphyry's 
Commentary, parts of the 'Metaphysics', Plato's 
'Sophist', parts of 'Timaeus', and finally the 
spurious 'De Plantis'."28
The Metaphysics of Aristotle had not been translated during 
the debates between al-Nazzam and Abu'1-Hudhail which took 
place before 850 A.D. The translation would have been made 
between the middle of the ninth century and the early part 
of the tenth century. However, al-Ash* ari stated that 
Abu'1-Hudhail was influenced by Aristotle.
"This view of his is taken by Abu'1-Hudhail from 
Aristotle, For in one of his books, Aristotle 
says that the Creator in His entirety is know­
ledge, in His entirety is power, in His entire-
28. M. Fakhry, History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 26,
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29"ty is hearing, in His entirety is seeing."
Though the translation of the Metaphysica had 
not yet been done in the time of these two scholars, it 
is quite reasonable to say that they were familiar with 
the concept due to the popularity of Aristotelian teaching 
throughout the new Islamic states, especially Persia (Iran).
This is a good example of the way in which the 
Mu^tazilites, in rationalizing their conception of God, 
especially the unity of God, employed Greek philosophy, 
which is also regarded as an external element in Islamic 
thought. This was the main target of the orthodox theo­
logians seeking to attack and abolish it. Al-Ash^ari 
strongly opposed such elements and he is regarded as a 
hammer of the Mu'* tazilites.
With regard to the problem of the attributes of 
God in general, al-Ash*ari is reported to have produced 
or reproduced the principle of 'Mukhalafa', that is,
'God's difference from all created being’. The principle 
of 'Mukhalafa' is derived from the concept of 'tanzih', the 
concept of excluding God from all human likeness, in contrast
29. Al-Ash^ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin. Vol. 2, p. 485, 
quoted from H.A. Wolfs an's article, p. 78.
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to the concept of *tashbih* (comparison) and 'ta^til' 
(divesting).
These two extreme positions of 'tashbih* (com­
parison) as held by the Anthropomorphists and 'ta*til’ 
(divesting) as held by the Mu*tazilites were the main 
targets of al-Ash*ari in his interpretation of the di­
vine attributes. The principle of 'Mukhalafa' is used 
to trace a middle path between these two extremes. Al- 
Ash*ari admitted the existence of the divine attributes 
with the qualification of 'tanzih'. Thus, he admitted 
the existence of the knowledge of God, but this knowledge 
cannot be compared to human knowledge neither can God's 
other attributes be compared to those of men.
With the qualification of 'Mukhalafa' he main­
tained that the attributes of God, especially the know­
ledge of God, are unique and fundamentally different from 
those of creatures- This is of course, to avoid the con­
fusion raised by the Mu'tazilites and the Anthropomorphists, 
both of whom are regarded as heretical by the orthodox sec­
tion of the Muslims-
In relation to the Qur'anic teaching regarding 
the problem of the divine attributes, he stated that with
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the qualification of the principle of 'Mukhalafa' no at­
tributes should be ascribed to God unless they are speci­
fically expressed in al-Qur'an. In this, he is in agree­
ment with the majority of the Muslim theologians and phi­
losophers.
As against the position of the Mu*tazilites, al- 
Ash*ari held that the knowledge of God is not identical 
with His essence and as against the Anthropomorphists he 
maintained that the knowledge of God is not distinct from 
Him. These two quotations below will serve to show his 
doctrine clearly.
"the essential divine attributes of knowledge, power, 
and life are eternal and subsist in God's essence."30
"God has attributes which inhere eternally in Him and 
are in addition to His essence."31
As far as these two quotations are concerned, al-Agh^ari 
has clearly departed from the Mu'tazilites conception of 
the knowledge of God as well as from Anthropomorphists- 
This is a very difficult balance to be preserved. The
30. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal Wa'1-Nihal, Vol. lo, 
p. 67, quoted from M. Fakhry, op cit.,'p. 231.
30, Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin, Vol. 1., p. 291o 
quoted from M. Abdul Hye, 'Ash^arism', in A History 
of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. 1., edited by M.M. Sharif, 
p. 227.
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following paragraph's are his philosophical arguments in 
favour of his doctrine.
Ci) The Knowledge Of God Is Not Identical 
With His Essence.
If the knowledge of God is identical with His 
essence, it would be followed by the conclusion that 'God's 
knowledge is God'c Then if this is true, one could address 
his petitions to God's knowledge rather than to God Himself, 
which is unthinkable. We found this argument in his reply 
to the argument of Abu'1-Hudhail. He said:
"Since you say that God's knowledge is God, say, 
'0 knowledge of God, forgive me and have mercy 
on me': And then he will decline to do this
and will be involved in contradictions."32
From this argument, al-Ash*ari proceeds to main­
tain that God has knowledge by which He knows rather than 
knowledge which is Himself. He set up a number of argu­
ments by firstly clarifying that the works of God are the 
works of Wisdom; then he proves that God is knowing by 
knowledge.
In the section discussing the orthodox position
32. Al-Ash*ari, Al-Ibana A^n Usui al-Diyana, po 95c
44
of maintaining that everything in the universe is attri­
buted to God's creative power, al-Shahrastani proves that 
the works of God are of wisdom. He says that this world 
and universe are well ordered and arranged, manifesting 
that there is a perfect and a wise architect who designed 
it. It is impossible to assume that this well ordered 
universe is the work of man, since man's knowledge is of 
generalities not details. Moreover man's knowledge is 
not in line with what man does. Therefore, there will be 
one other than man who is wise and perfect, who is able 
to arrange these phenomena. And finally, al-Shahrastani 
states that this is a position hold by al-Ash*ari. He 
says :
"Such was al-Ash*ari's system as expounded in'his 
books, and applied to the actions of the igno­
rant."33
Having these as the proofs that the work of God 
is the work of wisdom, then a 1-Ash''ari used this phrase 
at the very beginning of his argument in maintaining that 
God is knowing, not ignorant. He argued:
"Besides, if works of wisdom could be produced by 
one who is not knowing, we could not know but 
that perhaps all the determinations, dispositions 
and works which proceed from living beings pro­
ceed from them while they are unknowing. The im-
33. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l-
Kalam, p. 30,
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possibility of that proves that well-made works 
can be produced only by one who is knowing©"34
On the basis of this argument, he goes on -to 
prove the real question at issue. It has been proved be­
fore that works of wisdom prove that God is knowing.' This 
means that God has knowledge. The reason is that:
"If the works did not prove the knowledge of the 
man from whom they proceed, then they would not 
prove that the man from whom they proceed is 
knowing."35
From this statement, al-Ash*ari argued that : (a) If the
proposition that works of wisdom prove that God is knowing 
but do not prove that God has knowledge, is valid, then 
it entails the further proposition, (b) that works of 
wisdom prove our knowledge but do not prove that we are 
knowing. In other words, if proposition (a) is valid, 
it is possible also to accept proposition (b)© But, it 
is unthinkable to imagine proposition (b) that is, man 
has knowledge, but does not know and likewise man is know­
ing but has no knowledge» Therefore, both proporsitions 
(a) and (b) are invalid. And it is reasonable to hold 
that God has knowledge, since He is knowing. He has know-
34. Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma^, p. 13.
35» Ibid., p. 15o
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ledge, in the sense that He is not only knowing but knowing 
by knowledge.
The Mu*tazilites are reported to have claimed 
that the works of wisdom do not prove the knowledge of the 
man who is knowing. The reason they put forward is derived 
from their understanding of the meaning of 'his being know­
ing’, According to al-Ash*ari, they said:
"the knowing man may be known to be knowing by one 
who does not know that he has knowledge."36
From this understanding, they concluded that the meaning 
of 'his being knowing' is not that he has knowledge.
Al-Ash*ari replied to this question in two ways. 
First, if the understanding of 'his being knowing' as held 
by the Mu*tazilites is true, it would entail another pro­
position that 'works of wisdom prove that one has knowledge 
of them, but do not prove that he is knowing'» This has 
been proved before to be false. Second, al-Ash*ari dis­
agreed with the meaning of 'his being knowing* given by 
Mu*tazilites. He produced his understanding of the phrase 
as follows :
"I hold that one's being knowing means that he has 
36o Ibid., p. 16.
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knowledge. Thus one who does not know that 
Zaid has knowledge does not know that Zaid is 
knowing."37
Consequently, if we do not know God has knowledge, we do 
not know that He is knowing. So also, if we know God has 
knowledge, we know that He is knowing ; it is impossible 
to maintain that we know God has knowledge, but do not 
know He is knowing. And it is impossible to hold that 
we do not know that God has knowledge, but know that He 
is knowing. Since this is impossible, it is to be be­
lieved that God is knowing by knowledge rather than God 
is knowing by His essence.
What al-Ash*ari is trying to prove in his pre­
vious argument is that the knowledge of God is not iden­
tical with His essence. However, al-Ash^ari does not fi­
nish his argument here, but he goes on to prove that the 
knowledge of God is not distinct from Him. He set up se­
veral arguments to support this claim, which is perhaps 
his argument in reply to the Anthropomorphist conception 
of attributes.
(ii) Knowledge Of God Is Not Distinct From Him.
Just as he denied the claim that the knowledge
37. Ibido, p. 16o
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of God is identical with His essence, al-Ash*ari is also 
reported to have denied that the knowledge of God is dis­
tinct from Him. In other words, according to al-Ash*ari, 
God's knowledge is not distinct from Him, whether it is 
said to he as a quality apart from God's essence or as 
an attribute distinct from God. In his second set of ar­
guments on the doctrine of knowledge of God and other di­
vine attributes, he is trying to prove that these attri­
butes are not to be regarded as distinct from God Himself.
R. J. McCarthy explained the use of the word 
'distinct' here as: "Distinct from everything, i.e» a
separate entity in himself.Al-Ash*ari himself defined 
the word 'otherness' in his own understanding as: "that
39one of two things can be somehow separate from the other." 
Despite these two definitions of the terms involved, we 
have already learned that God is eternal, His knowledge is 
eternal and it is easier to suppose that these two eterni­
ties are not separate from one another. In other words, 
the definitions of 'distinct' and 'otherness' as understood 
by al-Ash*ari are used to maintain and clarify the whole 
argument of this section, that is the knowledge of God
38. Ibid., note 16, p. 16, 
39o Ibido, pp. 16 - 17o
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which is eternal is not distinct from God Himself who is 
eternal•
In this section of the argument, al-Ash*ari 
used the same method as was used in the first section; 
thus he argued :
"If one could claim that the work of wisdom proves 
that the knower is knowing and his knowledge is 
known subsequently, another could claim that the 
work of wisdom proves that the knowledge is know­
ledge 'and it is known to belong to a knower sub­
sequently. "40
These propositions are invalid and since the assertions 
are the same, therefore the proof that the knower is know­
ing is also to be regarded as a proof of knowledge.
After citing several passage of the Qur'anic 
verses in favour of his doctrine, al-Ash*ari concluded 
his doctrine by producing two propositions: (a) God is
knowing by Himself, (b) God is knowing by a knowledge 
which cannot be Himself. If (a) is the case, it would 
entail that He Himself would be knowledge. It has been 
proved to be false© If (b) is the case, then it also would 
entail another proposition, that is, He is knowing by a 
quality distinct from Him* If this is true, then we should
40. Ibido, p. 17.
50
have to say that quality is knowledge. Moreover, he 
said;
"But knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the 
knower be knowledge, nor can God be identified 
with His attributes. Do you not see that the , 
way in which one knows that knowledge is know­
ledge is that by it the knower knows?. For 
the power of man, by which he does not know, 
cannot be knowledge. Hence, since the Crea- ■ 
tor cannot be knowledge, He cannot be knowing 
by Himself. And if that be impossible, it is 
certain that He is knowing by a knowledge which 
cannot be Himself."41
Finally, he stated that if God is knowing by Himself 
or by a quality which can be Himself is possible, it 
would mean that 'knowing' does not refer to God Him­
self or not to a quality. This certainly would be 
impossible because there would be no affirmation 
either of God or of quality which cannot be Himself.
This has been an account of al-Ash ^ ari's treat­
ment of the central problem of the divine attributes, 
especially the problem of the knowledge of God. He re­
jected Jahm's solution by saying that to hold that 
knowledge of God is created is unreasonable. Al-Ash 
ari proves that it is eternal, and since it is eter­
nal, it is reasonable to hold that God knows the past, 
the present and the future. He opposed the Mu*tazi- 
lities' solutions claiming that God is knowing by His 
essence. He claimed that God is knowing by knowledge. The
41. Ibid., p. 19.
51
knowledge of God is not to be thought of apart from His 
essence, as held by Anthropomorphists. These two elements, 
firstly, knowledge is not God, and secondly, knowledge is 
not other than God are described as an effort of al-Ash*- 
ari to go and form his doctrine between the two extremists, 
the rationalist Mu/tazilites and the Anthropomorphists as 
well as the compulsionist positions.
With regard to the main issue of this study, 
that is the solution of Free Will and Predestination ac­
cording to al-Ash*ari, it is quite clear that all human 
actions are foreknown by God before they exist. If this 
is so, is the responsibility of man for what he has done 
consistent with the foreknowledge of God?, Is it thinkable 
that man receives punishments in the life hereafter for 
his wrongdoings, since these wrongdoings were foreknown 
by God before they existed or even before a man was born?. 
We shall find the solution to this question examining al- 
Ash* ari’ s solution to the main problem of this study.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CREATEDNESS OF HUMAN 
ACTION.
Al-Ash* ari, after arguing that God knows every­
thing past, present and future and arguing that God knows 
by a knowledge, proceeds to prove that everything created 
in the universe is created by means of God's capability, 
including the actions of man, whether they are compulsory 
or voluntary. From these positions rise a number of ques­
tions and suppositions. Since God creates everything in 
the universe, especially all categories of human actic .s, 
whether they are good or evil, can it be claimed that God 
is an evildoer?. If God creates everything, what is man's 
share of responsibility for his actions if we say that He 
knows these actions before they occur and both wills and 
creates them?©
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Al-Ash*ari primarily is concerned to prove that 
God alone is the Creator of the universe. Though God is 
the Creator of all in the universe, He is not an evildoer: 
man has his responsibility for what he has done. To make 
quite clear al-Ash* ari's proposed solutions, we shall pre­
sent them under different topics and areas of discussion. 
They are, ’the createdness of human actions', 'the problem 
of evil', 'the discussion of capacity' and finally 'the 
theory of acquisition'. These topics serve to show al- 
Ash*ari's approach to the most controversial issue in the 
history of Islamic theology and philosophy. With the prob­
lem of the knowledge of God as the background of al-Ash*- 
ari's understanding of God, we learn that al-Ash*ari's 
solution is unique. However some difficulties remain and 
may be dealt with by clarifying the terms used.
1. The Mu*tazilite Doctrine of Human Actions.
Before we proceed to discuss the createdness of 
human actions as viewed by al-Ash*ari, it is worth inves­
tigating briefly the Mu*taoilite thesis which is described 
as the counter-part of al-Ash*ari. In general, the Mu*ta­
zilites held that the voluntary astions of man are made 
by means of man's capability which is given to them by 
God. In particular, Abu' 1-Hudhail b, al-^ Allaf held that
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man has a capacity to act freely in the world©
Through the concept of ’tawallud' (generation) 
which he followed, he proves that certain actions are 
acts of man himself. He said:
"Man can cause in himself movement, rest, will 
and knowledge, but cannot cause accidents like 
colour and taste, the nature of which is not 
known. Secondary effects of his acts are his 
work, such as the pain caused by a blow or 
the noise produced by knocking two objects 
together."!
Since he says that man can cause knowledge, but not acci­
dents like taste, therefore, he is trying to divide human 
actions into two categories. Firstly, the actions of which 
man knows the modality, for example the flight of the arrow. 
Secondly, the actions of which man does not know the modali­
ty, for instance, pleasure and hunger. According to Abu'l- 
Hui^ail, man is said to be the author of his actions of the 
first category whereas God is regarded as the author of the 
second one.
However these categories of Abu'1-Hudhail were 
opposed by Bishr b. al-Mu*tamir (died 825 A.D) the leading 
theologian of the Baghdadite Mu*tazilites, Bishr b, al-
1. A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, p. 87.
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Mu*tamir said: "Whatever is 'generated' from cur deeds
2
is of our doing.” These two scholars, though they differ 
in the second category of actions of this concept, are in 
agreement on the problem of whether man is the author of 
his actions.
The motive of using this concept is quite ob­
vious, since like other Mu*tazilites, they wish to main­
tain the justice of God by dissociating God from such ac­
tions of man so that man is to be regarded as the respon­
sible agent of what he has done.
Another leading Mu*tazilite scholar. Mu*ammar 
b. *Abbad al-Sulami (died 842 A.D) of the Basrite school 
of the Mu*tazilites, held that human actions needed no 
creator. He introduced the theory of ?ma*ani' in order 
to justify his claim, and the following paragraphs are 
an elaboration of his view.
Mu*ammar made the distinction between what he 
called 'bodies' and 'accidents'. Regarding the existence 
of 'bodies' and 'accidents', he said that:
"the existence of bodies is to be ascribed to God, 
whereas the existence of accidents must be ascri­
bed to the 'action' of bodies themselves,"3
2, M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 63. 
3o- Ibid., p. 65o
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Then he goes on to make a distinction regarding the exis­
tence of the 'action'. This action, according to Mu*ammar, 
may proceed in either by of two ways: (a) by necessity
from its nature —  or (b) by free will or free choice»
An example of the former is the burning of the fire and 
an example of the latter is human action as well as the 
action of animals.
As far as human actions are concerned, they are 
regarded as actions of free will or free choice. This free 
will is to be regarded as accident and its existence is re­
garded as the actions of the bodies themselves. Since hu­
man actions are in the category of accidents they are, 
surely, not the creation of God, for God is only the crea­
tor of (bodies), therefore human actions are not the crea­
tions of God.
The argument he put forward is as follows:
Colour is regarded as an accident of which a body may or 
may not be susceptible» If the body is susceptible of co­
lour, then this colour belongs "to it by nature and is of 
its d o i n g " A n d ,  on the other hand, if a body might not 
be susceptible to the colour, "God might decide to colour
4» Ibrd», p. 65»
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the body, and yet the body might not receive the colour 
of which it is not susceptible."^ Therefore, it is to 
be maintained that, according to this argument that:
"God cannot be said to cause the accidents, except 
indirectly,that is, through the agency of the  ^
body which causes its own accidents naturally.''
From this notion, it is evidently, that Mu*ammar put the 
body as the true cause of its accidents, which are infi­
nite in number, rather than God. Therefore God is not the 
true cause of the accidents of bodies. And perhaps. Mu*- 
ammar is the object of the crucial criticism of this no­
tion, because he is in the position of maintaining that 
body is more powerful than God. His opponents charge 
him with claiming that:
"Qlod^ created a finite number of bodies and each 
body produced an infinity of accidents."7
Moreover, since human actions are the actions 
of bodies themselves, and bodies are the creation of God, 
does it not follow that human actions are the creations 
of God?. Or is man regarded as body so that we can sup­
pose that human actions are God's creation since bodies
5. Ibid., p. 65»
6. Ibid., pp 65 - 66.
7. A.S. Tritton, op cit., p. 101,
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are God's creations?. According to Mn*ammar, this con­
clusion does not follow. His doctrine of man will serve 
to show how Mu*ammar answers this question.
His doctrine regarding the nature of man is 
described as a critical solution, because he maintained 
that man is a spirit. This position rests on a distinc­
tion he makes between 'bodies' and 'substances'. He said 
that bodies are to be regarded as motionless, and possess 
length, width and depth. On the other hand, substances 
are souls (nufus). Man is not body, for body in its true 
sense is regarded as an instrument or tool or cover. And 
man has no accident like colour, etc. Perhaps soul re­
presents the highest being and transcends bodies and ac­
cidents. From this statement, it is obvious that accor­
ding to Mu*ammar, man is soul. This position shows that 
Mu^ ainmar s trying to establish 'man is a spirit'.
To this extent, regarding the act of man (man 
in his definition), he is reported to have held that:
"Man acts in the inward world of the will (fi nafsihi) 
Thus he is capable of knowledge, will, hate, and 
representation, but is incapable of accomplishing 
anything at all in the outward world. Whatever is 
generated in the world of nature, therefore, and 
whatever inheres in bodies, such as motion and rest, 
colour, and taste, heat or cold, eta., is the work
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of the body in which it inheres, through a ne­
cessity of nature."8
In his first argument, Mu*ammar proved that God 
is not the creator of human actions, since human actions 
are categorized as accidents and accidents are not the 
creations of God. Therefore, God is not the creator of 
human actions.
In his second argument, he is in a position to 
maintain that man is regarded as an intellectual subs­
tance (soul). Man is not ’body' but 'in a body’ and body 
is regarded as a thing to be inhabited. Man is not acci­
dent, and it follows that man is not the creator of human 
actions, for body is to be described as the natural cause 
of its accidents. It is evidently on the basis of these 
arguments then Mu*ammar proposed his philosophical proof 
that neither God, nor man (in his definition) is the crea­
tor of human actions. Therefore, his proposition that 
human actions needed no creator follows, because they exist 
through the agency of the body which causes its own acci­
dents naturally.
8. M. Fakhry, op cit., p. 66.
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It is reported that his aim in establishing 
the proposition that human actions need no creator, was 
to dissociate God from the creation of evil, to establish 
the justice of God.
This extraordinary solution of the problem of 
human actions was unsatisfactory to the great majority 
of Muslim scholars, especially the orthodox. Other Mu*- 
tazilite scholars differ from him regarding the theory of 
'bodies' and 'accidents'. The Mu*tazilites, in general, 
maintain that God is the creator of both 'bodies' and 
'accidents', whereas Mu*ammar as has been mentioned be­
fore held that God is the creator of bodies, but not 
accidents. Though the Mu*tazilites differed from him 
in this matter, they agreed that man was the author of 
his own actions.
With regards to his theological-philosophical 
development, it was reported that Mu*ammar was, like other 
leading Mu*tazilite scholars, influenced by external and 
non-Islamic elements, especially in his doctrine of 'ma*- 
âni'. However, substantiation of the claim that he was 
influenced by such philosophers requires a clear explana­
tion of the translation movement, especially of Greek works, 
In the previous chapter, we stated that most of the Greek
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works were not yet translated before the middle of the 
ninth century A.D., while Mu*ammar died in the 809 A.D. 
However, Anwar G. Chejne, without furhter evidence* 
stated that:
"Thus, an answer must be found to the statement of 
Ibn al-Murtada who asserts that Mu^ammar has been 
exposed to gnosticism and Zoroastrianism, and to 
al-Shahrastani who reports that he was under the 
influence of the philosophers."9
Moreover, he stated that. Mu*ammar's seniors such as 
Dirar b» *Amr (died 815 A.Di, JaJim b. Safwan (died 745 
A.D.) and V/asil b. *Ata‘ (died 748 A.D.) were not free 
from the influence of the Greek philosophy, and further­
more, it is evident that they influenced him in many as­
pects of his theological and philosophical doctrines.
As far as the idea of the doctrine of ’m,a*ani* 
is concerned, it is related to Indian philosophy.
"Professor Das Gupta writes that in the Nyaya system: 
the capacity of anything cannot be known until the 
effect produced is kno'/Wi, and if capacity to produce 
effects be regarded as existence or being, then the 
being or existence of the effect cannot be knovwi 
until that has produced another effect and that an­
other ad infinitum."10
9. Anwar G. Che j ne, "Mu'* ammar Ibn^Abbad al-Sulami; a 
leading Mu*tazilites of the Eighth-Ninth Century,", 
MUSLIM WORLD., Vol 51 (1961), p. 313.
10© A, S. Tritton, op cit., p. 100.
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As has been mentioned before, according to the doctrine 
of 'ma^ani' body produces an infinity of accidents. Like­
wise, in the Nyaya System, the existence of the effect 
cannot be known until it produces another effect* which 
leads to endlessness. Therefore., it is reasonable to sup­
pose that the doctrine of ’ma*ani’ is related to the Nya­
ya System in Indian philosophy»
If this is true, it is a good illustration of 
al-Shahrastani's claim that Mu * ammar was influenced by 
philosophers. And this is considered as the external 
element in Islamic thought, the influence of which al- 
As_h*ari spent so much of his life working to abolish.
In reply to the Mu^tazilite doctrine of human 
actions, al-Ash^ari puts forward his philosophical argu­
ments in favour of his position that human actions are 
created by God. His theory rests on one main issue. The 
Mu*tazilites, in general, hold that human actions are of 
two kinds: compulsory and voluntary. An example of the
former is 'shivering from fever' and an example of the 
latter is 'moving, approaching'. The Mu*tazilites main­
tained that compulsory actions are to be attributed to 
God, whereas voluntary action must be attributed to man 
himself. As opposed to this position, al-Ash*ari says
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that all human actions whether they are compulsory or vo­
luntary are God's creations. Based on this, he argues 
that God alone is true and efficient creator of all in 
the universe including human actions, compulsory and vo­
luntary. Moreover, he states that the creation of com­
pulsory and voluntary actions are not to be regarded as 
different. In other words, compulsory and voluntary ac­
tions are alike creations. The following paragraphs will 
serve to clarify al-Ash*ari's doctrine.
2, Al-Ash*ari's Doctrine of Human Actions,
(i) God is the True And Efficient Creator 
of All Actions.
In his attempt to deal with the problem of human 
actions, al-Ash*ari is concerned to oppose the views pre­
sented by the Mu/tazilites. He holds that the existence 
of every action in the universe is created by God's capabi­
lity, including the compulsory and voluntary actions of 
man. On this point, al-Ash*ari argued that although God 
is the sole creator of all categories of human actions, 
it does not entail the attribution of evil to God and does 
not contradict the concept of human responsibility. In 
contrast to the Mu/tazilite positions, he maintains that 
man's power of action is the same as every other accident 
of man's being: it is the creation of God,
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As has been mentioned before, Mu^ammar argued 
that human actions needed no creator at all, for God is 
the creator of 'body', but not 'accident'.. Since human 
actions are described as accidents, and accidents are 
not the creation .of God, therefore, God is not the crea­
tor of human actions. Moreover, man is also not to be 
called the author of his actions because accidents are 
caused by body through its nature, and man is not a 'bo­
dy', Therefore, man is not to be regarded as the author 
of his actions. From this theory. Mu*ammar made 'body' 
the true cause of its accidents (human actions) by its 
nature© Based on this proposition, we will investigate 
al-Ash*ari's reply to the position of Mu/ammar.
In one of his propositions to prove that 'God 
is not the creator of human action'. Mu*ammar argued that 
'God might decide to colour the body, and yet the body
11might not receive the colour of which it is not susceptible",
It is relevant to refer here to al-Ash*ari's proof of 
'god wills everything which can be willed, in the sense
12that those things which can be and'de facto' are willed'
Mu*ammar said: 'God might decide to colour the body'.
The problem arises, does God's will decide to colour the
11© Supra, this chapter, pp. 56 - 57.
12. Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 33.
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body?. In this regard, al-Ash^arl argued God wills every­
thing which can be willed. To support this claim he said:
"There cannot be in God's dominion anything which 
He does not will. For if there were in God's 
dominion something not willed by Him, one of 
two things would have to follow: either the 
affirmation of unmindfulness and neglect, or 
the affirmation of weakness, impotence, feeble? 
ness, and failure to attain His desire. Since 
such things cannot be said of God, there cannot 
be in His dominion anything which He does not 
will."13
The reason for this claim is that: if what God wills takes
place, it cannot be overtaken by weakness or failure. On 
bhe other hand, if what God wills does not take place, it 
would entail that He must be overtaken by weakness and 
failure. Similarly, with respect to Mu^ammar's proposi­
tions: if God wills to colour the body (which, according
to Mu^ammar, God might decide), and this does not take 
place (for, according to Mu^ammar, the body might not re­
ceive the colour of which it is not susceptible), then it 
would entail that God must be overtaken by weakness and 
failure. From this argument, it is certain, according to 
al-Ash* ari that Mu/ammar's theory results in the attribu­
tion of weakness and failure to God. This is impossible 
to say of God.
13. Ibid., p. 34.
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To be more precise with regard to the action 
derived from body (in Mu^ammar's theory), al-Ash*ari 
argued that :
"Similarly, then, if the taking place of an act 
of His which the Creator does not will would 
necessitate His weakness and failure to attain 
His desire or His unmindfulness and neglect, 
the same would be necessitated by the taking 
place of another’s act unwilled by Him."14
According to al-Ash* ari, all temporally produced things 
are the creations of God and all things which proceed 
from others are acts of God. Therefore, in contrast to 
Mu*ammar's position that human actions exist by the nature 
of body, they are believed to be the creation of God.
However, al-Ash*ari is reported to have believed 
in the course of nature, as reported by al-Shahrastani:
"he did allow a certain facility and ability (tarnak* 
kun) which a man feels himself to possess, namely 
soundness of body and a belief in the course of 
nature."15
Though al-Ash*ari agreed on the question of the course of 
nature, he does not in his doctrine maintain that nature 
can give existence of any kind.
14. Ibid., p. 35.
15. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu’1-Iqdam Fi I^lmi'l- 
Kalam, p. 38.
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"We have proved that God creates men's actions.... 
and he creates by choice and will, not by nature 
and essence."16
Regarding the question of 'body' and its nature, al-Shah- 
rastani again mentioned that:
"Body is composed of matter and form, so that if 
it exerted influence it would be in conjunction 
with matter; and matter has a privative nature, 
so that it is impossible that it should bring 
anything into existence."17
These two statements of al-Shahrastani are not reporting 
the position of al-Ash* ari, rather he is reporting his 
ov/n position and the other al-Ash*arites' o However, since 
he is also an al-Ash*arite, it is reasonable to suppose 
that these statements derive from al-Ash*"ari ' s doctrine.
As far as human actions are concerned, according 
to al-Ash*"ari, their existence is nothing to do with body 
and its nature, for God is all-powerful and God alone is 
the creator of all in the universe. Mu*ammar's theory 
that human actions need no creator would entail ascribing 
commitment of weakness and failure to God®
16. Ibid., p. 88. 
17o Ibid., p. 2 6.
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Furthermore, al-Ash* ari argued that the true 
and efficient Creator of all in the universe is God alone, 
and no other agent would be able to bring into existence 
any action in all its dimensions. He maintained that the 
total content of the being of any action is the product 
of an agent who determines it in its totality with knowing 
intention. We have discussed the knowledge of God in the 
previous chapter, whereby, al-Ash*'ari held that God is 
knowing by a knowledge and He knows everything in detail 
not in general. To prove the proposition that 'the created- 
ness of human action is by God', he argued that God alone 
knows the total content of the being of any action. From 
this proposition, he draws the conclusion that God alone 
is the true and efficient Creator of every action which 
exists in the universe.
By using the example of 'faith' and 'unbelief, 
he elaborates his argument and affirms that the true and 
efficient cause which determines the being is the cause 
in its total reality. He said;
"The rational proof of the creation of men's act 
is our experience that unbelief is bad, false, 
vain, inconsistent and of a certain contrariness, 
whereas faith is good, toilsome, and painful.
And it is our experience that even though the 
unbeliever deliberately exert to make unbelief 
good and right, it will be contrary to his in­
tention; and even though the believer wish that
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faith be not toilsome, painful, and vexatious, 
it will not be according to his wish and de­
sire o" 18
From this argument, it is evident that an act 
comes into existence by a producer who determines and 
knows the total content of its being, that is knows, 
the act of faith of the believer to be good, but the 
act of unbelief of the unbeliever to be bad and vain.
If this act comes into existence without a producer who 
knows and produces it as it really is, then surely, it 
would exist without a producer. This would fall into 
the theory of Mu*ammar who holds that human actions need 
no creator or producer. This has- been proved by al-Ash*- 
ari to be false and impossible. So it is certain that 
an act comes into existence as it really is by a producer 
who intentionally produces it as such. Moreover, he argues
"For if an act could come to be as it really is 
without someone who intends that, one could not 
be sure but that all acts are like that, just as, 
if an act could come to be without an agent, one 
could not be sure but that all acts are like 
that."19
Here, al-Ash*ari holds that if an act comes into existence
18o Al-Ash ari, Kitab al-Luma, p. 55.
19. Ibid., p. 55.
70
as it really is, without someone who intends it as it 
really is, then it would be possible that an act of the 
same content of being could exist not the same as the 
other though they are in the same content of beingo 
Therefore, it is possible to suppose that an act comes 
into existence as it really is by a producer who deter­
mines it as it really is and by someone who intentionally 
produces it as it really is®
The producer of the act of faith and unbelief 
would not need to be believer and unbeliever, for both of 
them can deliberately exert themselves to make unbelief 
good and right and make fatih not painful and toilsome. 
This intention shows that they are not the producers of 
faith or unbelief as they really are. It is certain 
that God alone is the producer of faith and unbelief as 
they really are.
Up to this point, al-Ash*ari proves that all 
works or acts need a producer who creates them knowing 
their real nature and contents Besides, if acts can be 
produced by a producer who does not know their real na­
ture and content, it would mean that they could be pro­
duced without a producer, and since this is impossible, 
the former case is also impossible. We all know of
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examples where a man does not know the real nature and 
content of what he is about to produce; therefore, it is 
possible for there to be a producer other than man him­
self. It is neither man who produces unbelief and faith, 
in their total content of essential reality, nor, on the 
other hand can material reality such as body cause any 
human actions, for, as has been stated before 'body' can 
affect nothing in things distinct from itself.
The central essence of these arguments is to 
make neither man nor body the producer of any act, but 
God alone as the true and efficient producer or creator 
of actions. This means that there is no agent who is able 
to produce it as it really is except God, and no one with 
power over it to produce it as it really is, in the sense 
that he creates it, except Godo
Since al-Ash*ari sees God as the true and only 
creator of human actions of all kinds, the question arises, 
what is the difference betweem al-Ash*ari and the Jabarites 
or the compulsionists?. Al-Shahrastani's account of the 
Jabarites as has been stated in the previous chapter men­
tioned that the pure Jabarite gave no power at all to man 
to perform his action; every action came from God. Al- 
Shahrastani goes on to report that:
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"As for those who assert that originated power 
has an influence in acting and who call this 
'acquisition' (kasb), they are not Jabaris, 
although the Mu*tazila apply the term 'Jabari' 
to one who does not assert that originated 
power in isolation (istiqlalan) has an in­
fluence in production and origination."20
From this report it is clear that the Mu*tazilites claim 
that those who do not assert that originated power has 
its influence to create, will be regarded as Jabarites. 
This certainly is an accusati n directed against al-Ash^- 
ari by the Mu*tazilites. For al-Ash *ari believed that 
God is the creator of all actions in the universe. But 
al-Shahrastani makes it clear that the upholder of the 
theory of acquisition is not to be called the Jabarite®
The Mu/tazilites maintained the capability of 
human action to establish the justice of God. On the 
other hand, the Jabarites or the Compulsionists maintained 
the uniqueness and absoluteness and omnipotence of God®
It is likely that al-Ash*ari in his first step towards 
his solution of the createdness of human actions followed 
the position of the Jabarite in maintaining that God alone 
was the true creator of these actions. But, as far as al- 
Ash* ari is concerned, he is not to be associated with the
20. W. Montgomery Watt, Free Will and Predestination in 
Early Islam, p. 96.
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Jabarite's doctrine. Following the orthodox position, 
he maintained that the justice of God in its true sense 
lay apart from both the 'Jabr' (compulsion) and the 'Qa- 
dar* (the theory in which man is capable of performing 
his own action, this is the Mu*tazilite position in ge­
neral) •
To prove his orthodox position, al-Ash*ari 
held that God was not the immediate agent who performed 
the act. He argued:
"Acts must have an agent who makes them as they 
really are, because an act cannot dispense with 
an agent. So if the agent who makes the act as 
it really is be not the body, God must be the 
agent who makes it as it really is. But the 
act does not need an acquirer who acquires it 
as it really is in the same way that it must 
have an agent w'-'O makes it as it really is, 
so that, if the act be an acquisition? God 
must be its acquirer."21
It is here he introduced the term acquisition’ 
which we shall develop later. Hg maintained that although 
God is the true and efficient creator of every act as it 
really is, it does not follow that God is the one who 
actually performs the act or is what he called 'the ac-
21, Al-Ash* ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 57.
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quirer' of the act. This problem lies in the distinc­
tion between the term 'creator* and 'acquirer*. He said 
that the action needs the creator who makes it as it 
really is, but it does not need the acquirer who makes 
it as it really is. In other words, the creator creates 
an action as it really is but the acquirer does not;
These two terms, by definition, are described as not co­
extensive, From this, it is obvious that al-Ash*ari is 
saying that: the action takes place through a created 
power of the one who actually performs the act, but this 
created power is not sufficient to determine the act in 
its total reality and content.
Despite his claim that compulsory actions and 
voluntary actions are alike in creation, which we shall 
discuss in the next section, he claimed that the proof 
of God's creation of compulsory actions is also the proof 
of God's creation of voluntary actions but not the ac­
quisition of the voluntary actions. He said that the 
proof of the createdness of compulsory actions as they 
are proves that the one who moves thereby because of the 
compulsory actions is not God. And the one who moves 
because of compulsory action is not the agent who makes 
it as it really is. The reason for his claim lies in 
the definition of 'the one moving*. He said the term 
'the one moving* is to be defined as the motion which
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find its locus in him. But God cannot be said to act that 
way. He used an analogy to clarify this:
"Similarly, if the acquisition is itself proof ,of 
an agent who makes it as it really is, it does 
not necessarily prove that the agent who makes 
it as it really is is ,also the one who acquires 
it; nor does it prove that the one who acquires 
it as it really is is also the agent who makes 
it as it really is. For the acquirer acquires 
a thing because it takes place in virtue of his 
created power over it. But the Lord of the world 
cannot be one able to do a thing in virtue of a 
created power, and therefore cannot acquire the 
acquisition, although He is the agent who really 
makes it."22
From this clarification, it is clear that God cannot be 
regarded as the acquirer of human actions, because by de­
finition the actions or event exist through a created po­
wer and on the other hand, God's power is uncreated, ab­
solute and transcendant.
To make it quite clear, the example given before 
should be applied, that is, the act of unbelief of the un­
believer. It has been proved that the unbeliever does not 
produce the act of unbelief in its total content of reality. 
From this, it follows that saying that the unbeliever ac­
quired the act of unbelief means that he disbelieved through 
a created power. The act of disbelief does not come into 
existence in its reality by the acquisition of the unbe­
liever. Therefore, by using this example, the act of
22. Ibid., pp. 57 - 58®
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unbelief of the unbeliever comes into existence through 
the acquisition of the unbeliever and the total content 
of its reality and essential nature of unbelief is deter­
mined by God.
(ii) Compulsory and Voluntary Actions are Alike 
in Creation,
The doctrine of human action of the Mu*tazilites 
is based on the distinction they made between the compul­
sory actions and voluntary actions. They claimed that 
compulsory actions are the creations of God, whereas vo­
luntary actions of man are attributed to man himself. Al- 
Ash* ari agreed with them in the distinction between com­
pulsory and voluntary actions of man, but disagreed with 
their use of the two categories. He maintained that there 
is no reason to make compulsory actions and voluntary ac­
tions different in creation. He argued, if the Mu*tazilites 
claimed that compulsory actions were God's creation due to 
their temporality, the case would be the same for voluntary 
actions which are also temporal. And if the Mu*tazilites 
claim that compulsory actions are the creation of God be­
cause they need time and space, voluntary actions are also 
the same needing time and space. He argued:
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"Another rational proof of the creation of men's 
acts is that the proof which proves that God 
creates necessary £compulsory] motion also 
proves that He creates acquired [voluntary"] 
motion. For that which proves that God crea­
ted necessary motion is the letter's beginning 
to be  and the same is true of acquired mo­
tion. The creation of necessary^ , motion'is also 
proved by its need of a place and a time — and 
the same is true of acquired motion. Hence, . 
since every proof by which one infers.that 
necessary motion is created by God compels 
one to judge that acquired motion is also 
created by God, the creation of acquired mo­
tion is necessary for the same reasons that ^3 
necessitate the creation of necessary motion."
For this reason, it is false for the Mu*tazi- 
11tes, according to al-Ash*ari, to believe that voluntary 
actions are not the creation of God, Both compulsory and 
voluntary actions are the creation of God, for every proof
of the createdness of compulsory actions is also the proof
of the createdness of voluntary actions.
Regarding the above argument, an objection arises;
if compulsory actions are regarded as necessary, then vo­
luntary actions are also regarded as necessary. And if 
voluntary actions are regarded as acquisition, then com­
pulsory actions must be regarded as acquisition® This 
objection derived from the essence of al-Ash*ari * s claim
2 3. Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.
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that compulsory and voluntary actions are alike in crea­
tion. In answer to this objection, he says that this 
does not follow from such a proposition because, by de­
finition, these two categories of actions are different,
"There is no necessity of that, because the two 
differ with respect to necessity and acquisition, 
For necessity means that to which the thing is 
constrained and compelled and forced, and from 
which it can find no way to get free or to es­
cape, even though it strive to be freed from it 
and want to escape from it and exhaust its en­
deavors to do so. So if one of the two motions 
be of this description, i.e. the description of 
necessity, as in the case of one shaking from 
palsy or shivering from fever, it is necessary 
motion; and if the other motion be of a contra­
ry description, it is not necessary motion."24
From this argument, it is stated that shaking from palsy 
or shivering from fever are regarded as compulsory actions 
and the act is characterised by the absolute incapacity 
of the man, and he is not free from such act. On the 
other hand, the act of going and coming and the like are 
regarded as voluntary actions and they are freely deter­
mined by the agent and the fact that they take place from 
the one who performs them through a created power.
The conclusion which can be drawn from this chap­
ter is that according to al-Ash*ari, God is the creator of
24. Ibid., p. 59.
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the universe, including the actions of man voluntary and 
compulsory. This does not mean that a1-Ash*ari can be 
associated with the determinists or compulsionists (Ja- 
barites), for he maintained that man is responsible for 
what he does through the theory of acquisition. This 
then is the central core of the problem of Free Will and 
Predestination or man's potentiality to perform his own 
actions, as it was debated in earlier centuries of Islam. 
However, the theory of acquisition here has not been dealt 
with fully, for in connection with the createdness of hu­
man action, there arises another problem that is, the prob­
lem of evil and God's justice. The question is that since 
God creates everything, even all human actions of good and 
evil, this means that God creates evil. Since God creates 
evil, can He be regarded as the evildoer or is He Himself 
evil?. Furthermore, if it is true that God creaias evil, 
then is it just or unjust for God to punish the evildoer 
in the life hereafter?. These questions will be treated 
in the next chapter on 'the problem of evil'.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The central, issue here is the question whether 
God is Justice or Injustice since He creates everything 
in the world, including evil. In the previous chapter 
al-Ash* ari argued that God was the real creator of the 
universe including the acts of man, compulsory and vo­
luntary and of good and evil. On the other hand, the 
Mu*tazilites in general maintained that God created on­
ly the compulsory, not the voluntary. In this regard, 
they held that God created only the good but not the 
evil.
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1. The Mu^tazilite Interpretation of the 
Creation of Evil.
The Mu^tazilites in general, from the very 
beginning, tried to maintain the justice of God and the 
absoluteness of God. To associate God with the creation 
of evil is against the claim of the Justice of God, If 
God creates evil, it follows that God is evil. And if 
God is evil. He must be unjust to His creatures. So, 
the main point of the Mu*tazilites is to avoid 'attri­
buting evil to God', ^his does not means, according to 
the majority of them, that God has no power over evil. 
Only al-Nazzam held that God has no power over evil, 
which distinguishes him from other Mu*tazilite scholars.
Before we elaborate the Mu*tazilite position in 
general, it is worth noting some scholars among them who 
have different interpretations of this problem. To begin 
with, it is interesting to consider the interpretations 
of Abu'1-Hudhail, who is said to have the followino po­
sition :
"That God has power to do evil, but that He did 
not actually do it because of His wisdom and 
compassion. Alternatively he argued that evil 
proceeds from deficiency, that there is no de­
ficiency in God, and that therefore it is im-
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1possible to suppose His doing evil."
Abu'l-Hudhail's reasons for avoiding ’attributing evil to 
God' are twofold, Firstly, the nature of the acts of God 
or God Himself, and secondly, the nature of evil. Since 
it has been agreed that God is wise and His works are 
works of wisdom, it is impossible to suppose God doing 
evil which is regarded as contrary to the work of wisdom. 
Moreover, it is impossible to suppose that God has power 
to do evil due to the nature of evil itself, that is,
'evil proceeds only from deficiency'. From these two 
reasons, Abu'1-Hudhail concluded that it is impossible 
to maintain that God, though He has power over evil, 
creates it.
Al-Nazzam, however, has a different interpreta­
tion of the problem of evil. He said that God neither has 
power over evil, nor creates evil. His position is based 
on two considerations, firstly, the nature of evil itself, 
and secondly, his idea of God. On the former he said that 
evil is the essence of a thing, therefore the power to create 
it is itself to be regarded as evil. From this argument,
1. W M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination In Early Islam, 
p. 72®
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it is obvious that he is trying to avoid the following 
statement, that 'if God creates evil, God Himself is evil' 
As for the latter, he argued:
"If God has power over evil, then the occurrence 
of evil is possible, and as the supposition of 
the occurrence of a possible thing entails no . 
impossibility, let us suppose that evil did 
occur. Now, God might or might not have know­
ledge of the evil which occurred. If we say 
that He did not have the knowledge of it, it 
would necessarily follow that He was ignorant; 
and if we say that He did have it, it would 
necessarily follow that He was in need of this 
evil; for had He not been in need of it. He 
would not have created it. When a person is 
not in need of a thing and knows its inherent 
evils, he will have nothing to do with it, if 
he is wise."2
This argument comes mainly from the theory of the works 
of God. Since it has been proved that the works of God 
are the works of wisdom, therefore, it is unreasonable 
to suppose that God is in need of creating evil. More­
over, it has been proved that God knows; then to suppose 
that God is ignorant of the occurrence of evil (so that 
we can suppose that He is not in need of evil) is also 
unreasonable. The conclusion which can be drawn from al- 
Nazzam 's argument is quite simple. Since God is not ig­
norant, the occurrence of evil is in His knowledge, there­
fore, He is in need of evil. But on the other hand, since
2. Mir Valiuddin, "Mu*tazilism", in A Historÿ of Muslim 
Philosophy, Vol. 1., edited by M.M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), pp. 199 - 219 (p. 209).
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God's works are regarded as works of wisdom, surely, He 
is not in need of evil. God is wise and so He has nothing 
to do with the creation of evil.
Another. Mu*tazilite scholar who had a different 
interpretation of this issue was ^Abbad b. Sulaiman (died 
864 A.D). He argued:
"All that God does is right. There cannot be any­
thing profitable for man which He does not do; 
if there were. He would be unjust. He does not 
create unbelief but gives the unbeliever power 
not to believe. He does not create anything 
which we call evil or bad, like hunger or sick­
ness; even the pains of hell are not evil, 
either really or metaphorically."3
His doctrine of uncreatedness of evil is based on the dis­
tinction he made between 'power over evil' and 'power to 
do evil'. An example of this distinction would be c wife's 
conception of a child. W.M. Watt elaborates this example, 
stating that *Abbad was influenced by Mu*ammar.
"Just as a man has power over his wife's concep­
tion of a child, although he himself does not 
have power to conceive a child, so (thought 
Mu*ammar) God may have power over movement 
(that is, can cause men to move) although He 
Himself does not have power to move, and like­
wise may have power over evil (sc. the evil- 
doing of men) but not power to do evil.'.'4
3o A.S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, p. 117, 
4. W. M. Watt, op cit., p. 82®
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The main problems to deal with were the 'attributing evil
to God' and 'the power of God', From this doctrine,
(
*Abbad is on his way to avoiding 'attributing evil to 
God' and at the same time asserting 'God is all powerful.'. 
In connection with the question of the unbeliever, he ar­
gued that since unbelief is evil, and God does not create
evil, therefore unbelief is not the creation of God. From
this argument, he draws the conclusion that God does not 
make a man to be an unbeliever, because unbelief is an 
addition to the man who is an unbeliever.
*Abbad's interpretation of evil was opposed by 
al-Jubba'i (died 915 A.D). He said that the distinction 
between 'power over evil' and 'power to do evil' is in­
valid. He maintained that from this distinction it would 
follow that God is weak though He has power, because He
is not the agent of such actions. As to the example given
by *Abbad, al-Jubba'i is reported to have said:
"If God brought about conception in a woman, he 
said, then He was 'one causing conception' (muh- 
bil), although this was the word which would 
normally be applied to her husband."5
Regarding his interpretation of evil and the. reward in the 
life of hereafter, al-Jubba'i is well-known for his failure
5. Ibid., pp. 83 - 84.
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to give a satisfactory answer to his pupil, al-Ash*ari, 
on the theory of 'salah wa'1-Aslâh (that is 'God is bound 
to do the best for His creatures’). His failure to ex­
plain this theory is regarded as one of the causes of al- 
Ash* ari * s separation from the school of the Mu*tazilites.
From these brief observations on the Mu* tazilite 
doctrine, it is obvious that, though they differ in inter­
pretation, they are alike in their main aim, to maintain 
the justice of God and uniqueness of God. On the basis of 
this similarity, we shall in the following paragraphs gather 
their arguments in general to see the problem clearly.
The Mu*tazilites believed that God's Will is not 
related to everything, for the following reasons:
"God's volitions are in time say that God wills 
His particular acts in the sense that He purposes 
to create them according to His knowledge. His 
will precedes the act by a moment. He wills that 
the good acts of His servants should come to pass 
and that the evil should not."6
From this proposition, they argued: "If God's will is re­
lated to everything. He wills evil....If He wills evil,
7
He is evil." From this argument, arise two fundamental
6# Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l- 
Kalam, p. 86.
7. Ibid., p® 87o
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questions: if it is not God who creates evil, then, who
is the creator of it?. And why does God not create evil?.
Their answer to the first question was given 
in the previous chapter, that voluntary actions are made 
by means of human capability given by God. Good and evil 
actions are described as voluntary. Therefore, they said 
that good and evil are made by man's capability given by 
God. It is false, according to them, to hold that evil 
is created by God.
Regarding the second question, the Mu* tazilites 
based their answer on the goodness of the creation of God. 
They held that God is only bound to do what is best for 
His creatures. They argued:
"A wise man only does a thing for a wise purpose; 
and action without purpose is useless folly. The 
wise acts for his own advantages or to profit some 
one else. Since God is exalted above profit ob­
viously He must act for the ptofit of others, and 
all His acts must be Salutary F the best for His 
creatures!."8
In this connection, the Mu** tazilites fall into 
two different groups. The first hold the opinion expressed 
by the Baghdadites that, in providing the greatest possible
8, Ibid., p. 127o
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powers of mind and body of man, God was bound to do the 
best for them; even the punishment in the life hereafter 
is the best for them because when man is released fran 
Hell, he is fit for Heaven. The second opinion was that 
of the Basrites, .who hold that creation was the result 
of grace and favour. Moreover God is bound to avoid 
weaknesses in men and do the best for them. Both of 
these sections are right, as far as their doctrine of 
'salah wa ’1-Aslah' is concerned. Both sections believed 
that God is bound to do the best for His creatures. This 
position followed from another interpretation of the un­
believer or the disobedient.
"If God knew that a people would be disobedient 
to His commands through an apostle, His know­
ledge would restrain Him from willing their 
performance. If He knew that men would dis­
believe and perish, their well-being would 
turn Him from His wish. It is as though one 
let down a rope to a drowning man, knowing 
that he would strangle himself with it."9
After this brief examination of Mu*tazilite in­
terpretation of evil, we shall now present the reply from 
al-Ash* ari.
9. Ibid®, p. 130.
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2o Al-Ash^ari's Interpretation of Evil.
The Mu tazilite position on the problem of evil 
was totally unacceptable to al-Ash*ari. The idea of main­
taining the justice of God by attributing the creation of 
evil to an agent other than God, according to al-Ash*ari, 
would only raise another fundamental problem, that is, 
it would compromise the sovereignty of God. If God is not 
the creator of evil, then God would not be all powerful. 
Evil exists, and to deny this, would mean denying the reali­
ty of our history. Now, if the occurrence of such evil has 
nothing to do with God, then it would entail two alterna­
tives: either (a) it exists by itself, or (b) it exists 
through an agent other than God. As to the former, al- 
Ash* ari has argued that every existing being does not 
exist by itself. This was discussed in the previous chap­
ter concerning Mu*ammar's view that ’human actions need 
no creator' but exist by their nature through the 'body*. 
Though Mu*ammar emphasized human actions, the same point 
is also applied to evil because evil is regarded as an ac­
cident, and every accident*must be ascribed to the action
•> 10of bodies themselves. Since the first alternative has 
been proved to be false, we conclude that evil exists
10. Supra, Chapter 3, p. 55.
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through another agent. If this agent is not God, then 
it would lead to a concept of dualism; which is contrary 
to the Islamic concept of God ^ d  creation. Al-Ash^arl 
develops his doctrine to maintain that God is a creator of 
evil, yet He is a, just God. In other words, according 
to al-Ash^ari, to say that God is the creator of evil 
does not at all lead to the conclusion that God is not 
a just, all-powerful God, First of all al-Ash/ari argued 
that evil is the creation of God as of other existences. 
Then in his reply to the Mu^tazilite position he said that 
God's actions are without purpose. Again to avoid any 
confusion with the Mu*tazilites, he maintained that God 
creates evil to be the evil of another being distinct from 
Himself, After dealing with these problems, as treated 
by al-Ash* ari, we shall examine his solution to the problem 
of the justice of God, in which he claims that to say that 
God creates evil is not inconsistent with the concept of 
the justice of Godo
(i) The Createdness of Evil by God.
It has been argued by al-Ash*ari that God creates 
everything in the universe, including the human actions com­
pulsory and voluntary. This claim leads to another, that 
good and evil are believed to be the creation of God, On
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the other hand, the Mu*tazilites maintained that God 
creates only good but not evil, because God does what 
is best for His creatures. Then the question arises, 
if God is not the creator of evil, who is the creator 
of it?. If it is created other than by God's capabili­
ty then it will follow that the agent (other than God) 
must be an effective power in the sense that he can create 
things contrary to God's creation. This is centainly a 
dualistic position.
Regarding the theory of effective pow^r al- Ashl­
ar! claimed that if God wills a thing, it is, and when He 
does not will it, it is not. We have discussed this in
the previous chapter, in his reply to Mu*ammar's posi- 
11tLon. However, in this section we shall elaborate it 
to see how it applies to the present discussion. He put 
forward two alternatives regarding the theory of effect- 
tive power :
"Which is the worthier of the attribute of effec­
tive power; he of whom it is true that, when he 
wishes a thing to be, it most certainly is, and 
when he does not wish it, it is not; or he who 
wills it to be and it is not, and what he does 
not will, is?."12
11. Supra, Chapter 3,^p. 64- 65.
12, Al-Ash*ari, Al-Ibana'An Usui al-Diyana, p. 101,
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He then claimed that if the Mu* tazilites are in favour 
of the second alternative, then they support an untenable 
conclusion. And if they were in favour of the first al­
ternative, then they would have admitted that Satan is 
worthier of effective power than God. From this argument 
al-Ash*ari is trying to oppose the Mu*tazilite position 
that evil was created by an agent other than God. This 
agent must be regarded as an effective power to will and 
create evil. This certainly follows from their position 
that Satan is more effective than God, since that he (Sa­
tan) wills, is, and what he does not will, is not. More­
over, this argument deals directly with the problem of 
the eternity of God's knowledge and His eternal Will. As 
has been discussed before, al-Ash*ari recognizes the eter­
nity of God's knowledge. Then, from this, he argued that 
'God eternally knows' will be true at a given time, and 
His will which is eternal will also be at that same time. 
Consequently, what He knows will not be eternally, nor 
what He eternally wills. Therefore, He wills what He knows 
in eternityo
The indirect consequence of this position is that? 
since God's Will is eternal, like His knowledge, there is 
no reason to maintain the creation of evil is without His 
will, for what He eternally knows will be and what He eter-
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nally wills will be; and what He eternally knows will 
not be, will not be and what He eternally wills will not 
be, will not beo Therefore, from this argument, there 
is no reason to maintain that evil is not created by God, 
for He knows it to be and wills it to be, and if He knows 
it not to be, He wills it not to be* It has been agreed 
by the majority of the Muslim scholars that God is the 
only effective power in the universe, which leads to the 
following conclusion;
"When God wills a thing, it is, and when He does 
not will it, it is not because He is the worthier 
of the effective power."13
Then, it is certain that another agent is not regarded as 
an effective power. If he is effective, this would lead 
to dualism. Since another .igent is not effective in power, 
therefore, to claim that evil is created by an agent other 
than God is meaningless and invalid.
The Mu*tazilite position in maintaining that God 
only creates good but not evil was reckoned to be similar 
to the dualistic concept of Zoroastrianism. In the teaching 
of Zoroastrianism, the world was regarded as the battle­
ground of good and evil. The good was led by Ahura-Mazda
13, Ibido, p. 101.
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and the evil was led by Angra Mainyu, also known later
_ . 14as Ahrimano
Regarding al-Ash**ari ' s argument concerning the 
Mu^tazilite position, he claimed that, if they held that 
God created only the good, not the evil, they would fall 
into the dualistic concept of God and creation as v/as 
found in the teaching of Zoroastrianism. Since the Mu*- 
tazilites would not accept the ^oroastrian position, the 
only alternative remaining to them, according to al-A si ari, 
was to maintain that God creates the good as well as the 
evil. This certainly will not fall into dualism but re­
cognizes the power of Godo However, just as surely, the 
Mu^tazilite conception of Creator and the creation is far 
different from that of Zoroastrianism. But al-Ash* ari 
maintained that the idea of separating the creation of 
good and evil is similar to the doctrine of Zoroastrianism. 
This claim v/as made by the later follower of al-Ash*ari,
Ibn al-Murtada, especially in his comment on Mu * ammar, 
"Mu*amm'r had been exposed to gnosticism and Zoroastrianism."15
14. Ninian Smart, "Zoroastrianism," Encyclopaedia of Phi- 
losophy, Vol. 8 (London, Collier, Macmillan Ltd., 
1967), p. 382.
15o Supra, Chapter 3, p. 61 note 9,
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(11) God's Actions Without Purpose.
It has been mentioned before that the Mu*tazi­
lites introduced the theory of 'Salah wa'1-Aslah' (God 
creates the best.for His creatures) to maintain the good­
ness and justice of God. From this theory they concluded 
that God is bound to do the best for His creatures. They 
also held that God does not create evil, for creating 
evil is surely contrary to the goodness of God. Al-Ash*- 
ari's reply to this theory was reported by al-5hahrastani.
Al-Shahrastani used the term 'ordhodox' to refer 
to a school including al-Ash*ari, opposed to the Mu/tazi- 
lite position. The argument is elaborated as follows:
If God is bound to do what is best for His creatures due 
to the fact that God who is regarded as wise must do and 
act for a wise purpose and an action without a purpose is 
useless and meaningless as claimed by the Mu*tazilites, 
then it would follow that the creator is absolutely depen­
dent. Firstly, this argument is a direct reply to the po­
sition of the Mu*tazilites in general, especially with 
regard to their theory of 'Salah wa '1-Aslah', by wich they 
argued that "a- wise man only does a thing for a wise pur­
pose; and action without purpose is useless folly.Secondly, 
it deals with al-Nazzam’s position in particular, who argued
that "If we say that God did have ^ knowledge of the evil4.
15. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nlhayatu'1-Iqdam Fj ^Ilmi'l- 
Kalam, p. 127.
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it would necessarily follow that He was in need of this 
evil, for had He not been in need of it, He would not 
have created it."^ '^  Regarding al-Nazzam's argument, 
though he does not say that God was in need of evil/ 
he used the premi.se that if, for example something 
exists, God had need of ito The phrase 'had need* 
shows that God's works have purpose. The orthodox 
said that God's actions are without purpose, therefore, 
al-Nazzam's premise in his argument is invalid. Regard­
ing the theory of 'Salah wa '1-Aslah' which involves the 
use of the phrase 'God's action is with purpose', the 
orthodox claim that the Mu*tazilites' theory is invalid, 
becuase to claim that God's action is with purpose would 
entail that God is dependent. If He is in need of some­
thing as the end product of His actions then He is indeed 
dependent and not self-sufficient. According to the or­
thodox God's actions embrace good and He does not destroy 
the world. However, this does not mean that He is in need 
of gain and advantage from His actions. Al-Shahrastani 
concluded that :
"There is a difference between a good consequence 
following divine operation, and attributing good 
and utility to the disposition of those acts, 
just as there is a necessary difference between 
a perfection which necessitates a thing's exis-
17, Supra, This chapter, p. 83,
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tence and one which merely evokes it. The 
former is an excellence like an inseparable 
attribute; the latter an excellence like a 
provocative cause."18
From the above argument, it is clear that ac­
cording to al-Ash‘ari and the orthodox, the Mu* tazilite 
argument does not hold, since the premise used by them 
is proved to be invalide Since the premise is invalid, 
the conclusion is also invalid. Therefore the theory 
of "Salah wa '1-Aslah' is meaningless.
Apart from the main aim to establish-the doc­
trine of the justice of God, the theory of 'Salah wa '1- 
Aslah' is to maintain that God's actins are the actions 
of good will and for the welfare of man* The theory is 
related to the idea of 'Providence' in Christianity. In 
this connection, it is of interest to compare these two 
ideas briefly^ Regarding the idea of 'Providence', John 
of Damascus had stated ;
"The works of God are partly according to the 
goodwill of God and partly according to per­
mission. Works of goodwill comprise all those 
which are undeniably good, while works of per­
mission are concessions."19
18. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'l-Iqdam Fi *Ilmi'l- 
Kalam, p. 127.
19. J- W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, Part 1., 
Vol. 2., (London, Lutterworth Press, 1947), p. 171.
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With reference to these two theories, in Islam 
and'Christianity, it is obvious that they are related in 
the sense they are similar in interpretation« To try to 
decide whether Christianity influenced Islam or Islam in­
fluenced Christianity in this matter, would lead to an­
other detailed investigation. As far as the theory of 
"Salah wa "1-Aslah" is concerned, it was developed by 
Wasil bo *Ata" (died 784 A.D). He was the earliest 
scholar of the Mu*tazilite school and is reported to 
have adopted this theory from the creed of Mu*bad al-
Juhani (died 699 A.D) and GhayIan al-Dimashqi (died be- 
20fore 743 A.D)o John of Damascus died in 750 and it is 
uncertain whether Muslim scholars were influenced by the 
Christians in this matter. However, the similarity of 
these two is quite obvious.
Regarding the origin of these two theories, 
Sweetman reported ;
"Both Stoicism and Platonism emphasized the provi­
dential view of the world. The two great reli­
gions, quite apart from Greek philosophy which 
they came to use, strongly maintained the same 
belief. Neoplatonism was equally sure and its 
various exponents, while expressing themselves 
in various ways, saw the order of the whole cos­
mos as manifesting in different degrees the Di-
20. Mir Valiuddin, "Mu^tazilism", in A History of Muslim 
Philosophy? Vol. 1., edited by M.M. Sharif, p. 205
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vine Intelligence. In the school of Alexandria, 
generally speaking, there was an optimistic view 
of the world."21
From this brief account of Greek philosophy concerning 
the 'providential view of the world', it is obvious that 
the theory of 'Salah wa '1-Aslah' and 'Providence' are 
closely related to Greek philosophy, and may have origi­
nated in Greek philosophy.
In this section we have dealt with al-A sh * ari's 
reply to the position of the Mu*tazilites in general and 
of al-Nazzam in particular. The Mu*tazilites, though 
they differ among themselves in interpreting the uncrea­
tedness of evil by God, all agree that by disociating 
God from creating evil, they establish the concept of 
Justice of God. However, al-Ash*ari accused the Mu*ta­
zilites of borrowing from Greek philosophy and adopting 
it into their doctrine. As far as al-Ash* ari is concerned, 
he is trying to abolish any external influence in Islamic 
thought, and he says that the Mu‘'tazilites are not free 
from such an influence in their interpretation of evil.
21. J. W. Sweetman, op cit., p. 175.
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( i i i ) God Creates Evil to be Evil of Another 
Being Distinct From Himself.
On the basis of the two sections discussed above, 
at least two conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, the 
controversial question of maintaining the justice of God 
(according to the Mu*tazilites) and sovereignty of God 
(according to the Compulsionists) remains unsolved. Se­
condly, it is evident that all Muslim scholars who deal 
with this issue give more emphasis to the question of 
'what God does' rather than 'what man does'.
Regarding the first conclusion, al-Ash^ari is 
closer to the Jabarites' position on upholding the sovereign­
ty of God. They held that all actions are determined by God 
whether they are of good or evil. This must be regarded as 
'attributing evil to God'. But al-Ash* ari, though he main­
tained the createdness of evil by God, argued that it did 
not follow that God is evil. Concerning the second conclu­
sion, since God's action is the main object to be discussed 
rather than man's action, it involved the question of 'God's 
decree'. The word 'decree' is a translation of the Arabic 
word 'Qada''. It might also be translated as 'decision'. 
According to al-Ash^ari, the term 'God’s decree' is’not 
co-extensive with the term 'evil' or 'unbelief. In favour 
of this claim, he produced his philosophical arguments which 
lead to a middle path position between the two extreme
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schools, that is the Mu*tazilites and the Compulsionists 
(including the Jabarites).
It has been argued before that God is the ef­
ficient creator of everything in the universe in the sense 
that He creates things as they really are, faith to be 
good, and unbelief to be bad and false. On the other hand, 
man, through experience, wants unbelief to be good and 
feels that faith is painful. Since God is the true pro­
ducer of unbelief. He can never be the unbeliever, who 
desires that unbelief to be good, neither can He be the 
producer of faith that is painful. Al-Ash*ari then argued:
"So if the one who produces unbelief as it really 
is cannot be the unbeliever, and if the one who 
produces faith as it really is cannot be the be­
liever, then the intentional producer of both 
must,be God Most High, Lord of the Worlds."22
The solution of the problem is therefore as fol­
lows: it has been shown that God is the producer (creator)
of evil, as it really is. He cannot be the evildoer, who 
desires that evil be good (as contrary to its reality). 
Therefore, from this analogy, it follows that, according 
to a1-Ash*ari, God creates evil to be evil for another,
22. Al-Ash^ari, Kitab a1-Luma*, p. 56.
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not for Himself. He confirmed this claim by a statement:
"But I maintain that evil is from God in the sense that
23He creates it as evil for another, not for Himself."
With respect to the position of Abu’l-Hudhail, 
who argued that evil proceeds only from deficiency, it 
is obvious that al-Ash *ari should agree with this sta­
tement, for al-Ash*ari said, evil is bad and vain. But 
the point on which they differ is derived from Abu'l- 
Hudhail's statement that 'there is no deficiency in God', 
Al-Ash*ari should also agree with this statement, for he 
is in the position of maintaining the absoluteness of 
God. Their difference lies in their different under­
standing of the actions of God, especially with regard 
to evil. Al-Ash*ari argued that God creates evil to be 
the evil of another, not Himself and this certainly en­
tails that evil proceeds from the evildoer (man), not 
God. Therefore it is true that evil is a deficiency, 
but the second premise, 'there is no deficiency in God' 
in invalid because evil proceeds from the evildoer, not 
God. Since, according to al-Ash**ari, God creates evil 
to be bad and vain, whereas the evildoer wants it to be 
good.
23. Ibid., p. 58
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(iv) The Justice of God
Al-Ash*ari argued in favour of the position that 
evil is created by God for another, not for Himself, and 
God could not be held to be an evildoer or evil itselfo 
However, this position does not directly answer the ques­
tion whether God is just or unjust. At first sight, al- 
Ash*ari's position could easily be taken as establishing 
God as unjust to His creatures. Thus, the question of 
the justice of God should be dealt with in another way. 
To analyse this issue, we have to define the terms in­
volved. Since, as has been mentioned before, all Mus­
lim scholars emphasise the question of 'what God does' 
rather than 'what man does', the term 'God's decree' 
must play a vital role in dealing with this problem. 
Besides that, the terms 'evil' and 'justice' should be 
clarified as to what al-Ash^ari meant by them.
Regarding the term 'God's decree', al-Ash*ari 
defined it in his reply to h^e question whether God de­
crees acts of disobedience. He answered, "Yes, in the
sense that He has created them, and has written them 
24down." From this statement, it is obvious that al-
24. Ibid, p. 65,
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Ash* ari defined the term as co-extensive with the term 
'God's creation'. We have already discussed his posi­
tion, maintaining that God creates all in the universe 
as it really is. And in this regard God is understood 
to have decreed all things in the universe including 
what is good and what is evil. Since evil is part of 
God’s creation and is also to be regarded as part of 
what God has decreed, therefore, the term 'evil' is 
not CO— extensive with the term 'God's decree'. It can 
be said that God's decree is co-extensive with God's 
creation. But since the existence of evil is only a 
part of God's total creation, it cannot therefore be 
said that evil is co-extensive with God's decree.
From this clarification, it is unreasonable to claim 
that the existence of evil in the sense that God creates 
it, entails anything inconsistent with the term 'God's 
decree’, for evil is not co-extensive with the term 
'God's decree'.
Al-Ash*ari divided 'decree' into two kinds. 
Firstly, decree in the sense of command, announcement 
and information; this is right. Secondly, decree in 
the sense of creation; this includes right and wrong.
By using the word 'unbelief as an example of 'evil', 
he concluded :
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"We are pleased that God has decreed unbelief as 
bad and determined it as false, but we are not 
pleased that the unbeliever is thereby unbe­
lieving because God has forbidden us that."25
It is obvious that, though al-Ash*ari believed in God's 
decree, it does not follow that he is content with the 
evil of the evildoer, for God does not command such 
acts.
As to the term 'justice', al-Shahrastani stated 
the definition given by the orthodox including al-Ash*ari:
"Justice, in fact, consists in giving things their 
place, and this implies acting as Lord according 
to His own will and knowledge. The opposition is 
unjustice and it is inconceivable that He should 
be wrong in His decision and unjust in His deal­
ing ."26
The term 'evil' has been defined and discussed 
lie fore and does not need to be dealt with again. Brief­
ly, evil is simply bad and vain.
As far as al-Ash* ari is concerned, if we are 
to establish the 'justice of God' with respect to God's 
decree and the createdness of evil by Him, we are able
25, Ibid., p. 66.
26. A, J. Wensinck, op cit., p. 85.
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to justify it through a correct use of these terms.
Al-Aéh* ari has proved that God is the true 
and efficient creator, for He creates things as they 
really are and God's decree in the sense of creation, 
involves what is good and what is evil. But it has 
been stated that God's decree in the sense of command 
is regarded as right, therefore the term 'evil' is 
not co-extensive with the term 'God's decree'. Re­
garding the createdness of evil, God creates evil in 
the sense that He creates it to be vain and bad. This 
indicates that He is giving evil its place as bad an 
vain. Referring to the term 'justice', that is, 'gi­
ving things their place', therefore, what God does 
in the sense that He creates evil is not incompatible 
with the concept of justice. Therefore, there is no 
reason to say that God is unjust, though evil is be­
lieved to be a creation of God, for 'evil' i^ created 
by God as it really is, to be bad and vain.
On the other hand, if we are to establish the 
justice of God in connection with human responsibility 
and human action, it demands another interpretation, 
which will be taken up in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN CAPACITY.
In his 'Discussion of the Capacity', al-Ash*ari 
leads us to the conclusion that man has no causality 
at all, but what God wills and creates for him. This 
is significant for it is the problem with which we are 
concerned. The word 'capacity' is the translation of 
the Arabic word 'istita*a', and it is sometimes trans- 
lated as 'faculty'. This chapter will elaborate al- 
Ash*ari's arguments and his reply to the Mu*tazilite 
positions on the problem concerned. This chapter will 
be mainly based on his discussion in his Kitab al-Luma*,
1* Ibid., p. 128.-
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The way he introduced this problem is quite 
different from the way he introduced other chapters 
in his work. He does not explore the problem with the 
citing of the Qur'anic verses as he does in other chap­
ters, rather he cited them after he produced his philo­
sophical arguments as if to confirm what had been ar­
gued philosophically. Besides the fact that his 'dis­
cussion of capacity', like other chapters, attempted 
to reply to the Mu*tazilite positions, it also offered 
an understanding and definition of the term 'capacity'. 
Using this as a basis, he proceeded to draw up his so­
lutions.
1. The Mu^tazilite Theories of Human Capacity,
Beginning from their position that human actions 
are of man's own initiative, the Mu*tazilites went on 
to develop their theories on the problem of human capa­
city. These differ from those of the orthodox as well 
as al-Ash*ari. To deal with the Mu*tazilite positions, 
we will discuss the positions of Abu'1-Hudhail and al- 
Nazzam,
Regarding Abu'1-Hudhai1 * s theory of human capa­
city, al-Ash*ari reported, "Man lives and is capable,
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and life and capacity are both distinct from him." 
This position is common to the majority of the Mu*ta- 
zilite scholars except al-Nazzam. To explain the na­
ture of 'capacity' he is reported to have said:
"Capacity is an accident, something more than 
bodily soundness and health; actions of the 
heart occur at the same time as capacity, 
those of the members in the second time."3
This position is derived from the concept of moment where 
he divided the occurrence of actions of man into two ca­
tegories. First, the actions which are incomplete in 
the sense that they only occur in the human heart. Se­
cond, the actions which are complete in the sense that 
they occur in reality. The former are regarded as the 
actions which exist in the heart of man and the man has 
to make his decision whether to choose one action or the 
other. The latter are regarded as the performance of 
the actions decided upon in their real existence in the 
world through human capability.^ This concept of Abu'l- 
Hudhail is reported by al-Ash*ari as follows:
2o Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'.'khtilaf al- 
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 229.
3. A. So Tritton, Muslim Theology, p. 87.
4. W. M. Watt, Free Wil" and Predestination In Early 
Islam, p. 70.
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"Man is able to act in the first, and he acts in 
the first, and the act occurs in the second ; 
for the first moment is the moment of 'yaf*alu' 
[will act or act^ and the second moment is the 
moment of *fa*ala' [acted"]."5
To make this concept more clear it is important to 
note Abu'1-Hudhail's definition of 'moment'. He is 
reported to have said:
"The moment is the division (farq) between acts 
and it extends through the interval from act to 
act, and with every moment there originates an 
act."6
Abu'1-Hudhai1's understanding of human capacity
is closely related to his doctrine of the uncreatedness
of human action by God. He had argued that the actions
of which man knows their modality such as the flight
7
of the arrow, are regarded as man's own actions. Re­
lating this statement to the problem with which we are 
concerned here, it is clear that when a man has made a 
decision to perform a particular action in the first mo­
ment, he is supposed to have a knowledge of its modality. 
And moreover, Abu'1-Hudhail stated that capacity exists 
in that moment and is realised in the second moment.
5. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al- 
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 233, quoted from w.M. Watt, Free 
Will and Predestination In Early Islam, p. 70.
6. A1-Ash*ari. Ibid., Vol. 2., po 443, quoted from 
W. M. Watt, ibid., p. 70.
7. Supra, Chapter 3, p. 54.
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This means he holds that capacity precedes the act, 
the decision exists in the first moment and the act 
exists in the second moment, and these are regarded 
as man's own actions.
Al-Nazzam, on the other hand had a different 
position regarding whether human capacity is distinct 
from man or not. He said, according to al-Ash*ari:
"Man lives and is capable by himself, not with 
the life and capacity distinct from himself."8
Regarding the question whether man acts in the first 
moment or the second moment, he is reported as holding 
a different view from Abu'1-Hudhail. According to al- 
Nazzam :
"Man is able in the first moment to act in the 
second moment. Before the existence of the se­
cond moment it is said that the act will be 
performed (yuf‘alu) in the second moment; when 
the second moment has existed, it is said that 
the act has been performed (fu'ila). That of 
which 'will be performed in the second' is predi­
cated before the existence of the second is the 
same as that of which 'has been performed in the 
second' is predicated when the second moment has 
come into being."9
8. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 229,
9o Ibid., p. 234, quoted from W. M. Watt, Free Will 
and Predestination In Early Islam, p. 71.
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When we compare the positions of Abu'1-Hudhail 
and of al-Nazzam regarding the acts of man in the theory 
of moment, the distinction between their vieve is quite 
obvious. Abu'1-Hudhail explained in his theory that 
the act had been .started or existed in the first moment 
which, as mentioned before, was the moment of decision. 
Though in the moment of decision, it was in man's heart 
to choose the act, Abu’1-Hudhail said the act had also 
occurred in that moment, and the second moment, he re­
garded as the realization of that action. On the other 
hand, al-Nazzam appeared to have maintained that in the 
first moment the incomplete act or the act in the time 
of decision, can be regarded as an act, but it cannot
be established as existing, unless the second moment 
10comes.
As the consequence of this position, another
interesting question arises, whether 'capacity' can
precede the act or not. To deal with this question the
Mu*tazilites held different positions, but the majority
11of them said that capacity is before the act. More­
over, since Abu'1-Hudhail said that the act had been
10. W. M. Watt, Ibid., p. 71.
11, Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 230,
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started in the first moment, he held that incapacity
could occur in the second moment in the sense that the
12act occurred without the existence of power. "A
little speech may - accompany dumbness, action (move-'
13ment) may accompany death"
Another fundamental problem to be dealt with
in the discussion of capacity is whether power is over
both it and its contrary. The Mu*tazilites in general,
after asserting that the capacity is before the act,
went on to say that power over a thing is also power
over its contrary. Moreover they said: "When one of
the contraries occurs it is necessary for man to be at-
14tributed with power over it and its contrary."
For Abu'1-Hudhail, the power occurs in the mo­
ment of decision, which means that in that moment, man 
is regarded as a capable agent to decide to perform the 
act, as well as to act, though the act really exists 
in the second moment. This position is confirmed by 
his claim that incapacity may exist in the second moment
13. Ibid., Vol. 1., p. 230.
13. Ibid., Vol. 1., p. 232. quoted from W. M. Watt,
Free Will and Predestination In Early Islam, p. 71.
14. Al-Ash*ari. Ibid., Vol. 1., p. 231.
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in the sense that the existence of the act took place 
without the existence of the power of the agent. This 
solution is more easily understood when we refer to his 
understanding of the term 'moment*. W, M, Watt wrote:
"The point is, however, that Abu'1-Hudhail is not 
thinking so much of time as measured by a clock, 
but rather of time as experienced, in a somewhat 
Bergsonian sense,"15
When man makes a decision in the first moment, according 
to Abu'1-Hudhail, he is regarded as an agent of a decided 
action. The term 'decision* is equivalent to the term 
'choice* (ikhtiyar). Therefore, the concept of free 
hoice of human action, according to Abu'1-Hudhail star­
ted in the first moment. From this it follows that the 
c acity of man exists in that moment, for man is sup­
posed to have knowledge to decide and be able to decide 
and act. This makes Abu'1-Hudhail hold that man is a 
responsible agent though the act is not realized in the 
second moment. Therefore, non-occurrence of capacity 
or power, according to Abu'1-Hudhail, results in the 
non-occurrence of decision and also involves the non­
existence of choice. In this sense, it is clear that 
the act does not exist and man is not its agent of 
such an act. For, "When a man is not choosing (mukh-
15. W, M. Watt, op cit., p. 70.
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târ), he is not the agent of the action, to which he is 
compelled (mudtarr) and forced (mujbir)
Al-Nazzam maintained that capacity is man him­
self, since he made no distinction between man and his 
capacity. He then emphasized more the will of man as 
the only action of man:
"Man’s only act is will and that as the result 
of suggestions which are necessary and both from 
God, The bad are not to mislead men but to make 
their choice real. The will is movement in man; 
what happens outside him is the work of God 
through nature. Those acts, which proceed im­
mediately from will, follow it inevitably."17
Regarding the term 'suggestion', he connected it to his 
analysis of k .owledge, and his def nition of the term 
’choice'. W. M. Watt explains:
"Al-Nazzam also appears to have been the first to 
make tïîe point that for a proper choice the man 
must have before his mind two 'suggestions', one 
telling him to go forward, the other to desist."18
Al-Nazzam said that when a man is confronted with these 
two suggestions, he is to decide which one to choose. 
Al-Nazzam sees the will of man as the force in man to
16, M, Schwarz, "Acquisition (Kasb) in Early Kalam,", 
in Islamic Philosophy and The Classical Tradition., 
edited by S. M. Stern, (Oxford, Bruno Cassirer 
Publishers Ltd., 1972), pp. 355 - 387 (p. 370).
17, A. S. Tritton, op cit., p. 93.
18o Wo M. Watt, op cit., p. 73.
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act, for he said that ’will is a movement in man’ and
'capacity is man himself’. From these statements, it
is obvious that al-Nazzam’s definition of choice and
the man who chooses is: "him, who when he wills (sha’a)
19acts, and when he’does not will, does not act." This 
position was not in agreement with the majority of the 
Mu tazilites, for he said that the suggestion to do 
and not to do occurs in the human mind.
Having looked at these arguments of the Mu^ta­
zilites in brief, we shall discuss al-Ash^ari’s reply 
to each in turn. There are many arguments of the Mu^- 
tazilites which we have not discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs and in fact there are many Mu^tazilite scho­
lars involved in this debate, but in this brief inves­
tigation it is impossible to analyse every respect of 
debate and every person involved. However, we have 
produced the most important points to which al-Ash 
ari responded in his Kitab al-Luma^ and elsewhere 
in his works.
Abu’1-Hudhail and al-Nazzam are representatives 
of the Mu*tazilite scholars who although belonging to
19. M. Schwarz, op cit., p. 370.
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the same school, differed among themselves in inter­
pretation of the problem which concerns us. However, 
although they differed they still agreed that man has 
power to act, and he is the responsible agent and the 
justice of God can be upheld.
2, Al-Ash^ari's Discussion of Human Capacity.
At the beginning of his discussion of human ca­
pacity, al-Ash*ari makes clear his definition of human 
capacityo The definition of the term is important for 
him in dealing with the critical issue which emerges 
from the subject. However, he does not define the term 
'capacity' independently, but with regard to its rela­
tions to man. We have discussed al-Nazzam's position 
in which he said that capacity is the man himself. In 
contrast to this claim, a1-Ash*ari argued that al-Nazzam's 
position is untenable. If al-Nazzam*s position were cor­
rect, then it would follow that, 'capacity' is a reali­
ty and a necessity of a man. This, according to al-Ash*- 
ari, is not possible because man is not capable all the 
time. Since man is sometimes incapable, therefore, ca­
pacity cannot be the reality of man. For this reason 
he claims that human capacity is distinct from man him-
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self. His argument is as follows:
"He ^ man] is sometimes capable and sometimes 
impotent, just as he knows at one time and 
does not know at another, and now moves and 
again does not move. Therefore he must be 
capable in virtue of something distinct from 
him."20
The existence of capacity in man indicates that man is 
capable. On the other hand, mon-existence of capacity 
indicates that he is incapable. If capacity is man 
himself then to suppose that he is incapable is impos­
sible (referring to al-Nazzam's position which is that 
capacity is the reality of man himself). But it is 
certain that man is sometimes incapable, therefore ca­
pacity is something apart from man.
However, if we refer to al-Nazzam’s position 
as a whole, this argument of al-Ash* ari's answer is 
not adequate. We have already discussed al-Nazzam's 
claim that when man wills he acts, when he does not will, 
he does not act. The term 'impotent' is the point where 
al-Ash*ari differ from al-Nazzam. With respect to the 
terms 'impotent', 'will' and '.ict', it is clear, accor­
ding to al-Nazzam that they can be related as follows:
20o Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, n. 76,
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the existence of will entails the existence of action, 
but capacity also exists in the time of suggestiono The 
non-existence of will entails the non-existence of ac­
tion. The non-existence of will, according to al-Nazzam, 
is a result of choosing in the first moment of the ac­
tion, And it is true that choosing not to will is done 
by a capacity in the mind of man in the first moment 
of the actiono With regard to this problem, al-Ash*ari 
in his argument of the distinction between man's capa­
city and man himself, does not dir ctly answer the po­
sition of al-Nazzam, but his answer follows from his 
understanding of human capacity.
As far as al-Ash*ari's position is concerned, 
human capacity is regarded as an accident of his being. 
This is due to the fact that man cannot be described 
as capable at every moment. This position is in agree­
ment with the position of Abu'1-Hudhail who held that 
'human capacity is an accident'. However al-Ash *ari 
agreed with Abu'1-Hudhail only on this point, but in 
all interpretations in which Abu'1-Hudhail departed 
from this position, al-Ash*ari adapted a different 
position.
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Through the theory of moment, Abu'1-Hudhail 
held that capacity or power precedes the act. This con­
clusion was rejected by al-Ash*ari, who said, that ca­
pacity did not precede the act. He argued that this 
was so:
"...because the act must begin to exist either 
with the capacity at the very moment that the 
latter begins to be, or after it. If the for­
mer is the case, then it is true and certain 
that the capacity exists with the act and for 
the act. But if the existence of the act is 
posterior to that of the capacity —  and there 
is a solid proof that capacity does not endure 
-—  then the act must begin to exist in virtue 
of an inexistant power."21
The majority of the Mu*tazilites, especially Abu'l- 
Hudhail and al-Nazzam, through the theory of moment, 
fall into the second category in the above argument. 
Abu'1-Hudhail claimed that the incapacity would exist 
in the second moment, as has been discussed before. 
Al-Ash*ari argued, if this is the claim then it would 
be possible for the man to act though he is impotent 
during the time when the act is realised. This is un-
22 Lthinkable. The Mu tazilite position is also untena­
ble for another reason. Al-Ash*ari argued that the ca­
pacity does not endure. According to al-Ash*ari the 
endurance of the capacity would be through either of
21o Ibid., p. 77o
22. Ibid., p. 77.
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two alternatives; first, of itself or second of the 
existent quality of durability. He elaborated these two 
alternatives :
"Now if it were to endure of itself, it would 
have to be its own duration, and it could not 
exist save as enduring, ^ t  this would ne­
cessitate that it be enduring at the very mo­
ment that it begins to be. On the other hand, 
if it were to endure because of a duration sub­
sisting in it —  and duration is a quality —  
a quality would subsist in a quality, and an 
accident in an accident; and that is false,"23
It is here that al-Ash^ari holds human capacity cannot 
exist before the action exists, as held by the Mu*tazi- 
lites especially Abu'1-Hudhail in his theory of moment. 
Since the second alternative has been proved to be fal­
se, according to al-Ash*ari, it follows that the capaci­
ty exists in the moment the action is realised. There­
fore, it is to be regarded as capacity with the act and 
for the act.
Another position of the Mu*tazilites to which 
al-Ash*ari replied is the question of whether a power 
or capacity over a thing is also a power or capacity 
over both it and its contrary. As has been mentioned 
before the majority of the Mu*tazilites maintained that
23. Ibid., p p .  77 - 78.
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the power over a thing was the power over both it and 
its contrary. Al-Ash*ari disagreed with this, saying 
that a power over a thing is for that thing and cer­
tainly not for its contrary. If we refer to Abu'l- 
Hudhai1 * s position, it is obvious that he maintained 
that the power is for both it and its contrary. This 
is derived from his conception of decisions of man in 
the first moment, since he said that man is capable 
to decide the action, and the action is regarded as 
existing in that moment, therefore, capacity is the 
power of both. Al-Ash*ari argued:
"It is a condition of created power that its 
existence include the existence of the object 
of the power. For if that were not so, and 
if it could exist for one unit of time with­
out an object, then it could exist for two 
or more units of time without an object, 
since there is no difference between one 
unit of time and two or more units. And if 
that were so, it could exist perpetually, 
the creature possessing it being all the 
while an agent in no wise acting."24
The limitation in the definition of 'capacity' as pro­
posed by al-Ash*ari, suggests the answer to the problem 
concerned. This argument is concerned with the contrast 
between the nature of human power which is created and 
that of God which is eternal. Regarding the problem of
24. Ibid., p. 78,
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God’s power, al-Ash*ari said it is an attribute of
God, transcendent in His Being and that His power has
no temporal relationship with the objects of actions
in the temporal world. Moreover, God's power is eter-
25nal in His actions.
On the basis of this position, al-Ash *arl con­
cluded that the nature of human power which is created 
entails the existence of its object when it exists.
If this proposition is rejected, then it would neces­
sarily follow that human power is eternal. To say this 
would lead to a non-Islamic concept of being. It is 
not in the compass of Islamic thought to hold that 
things are non-material and have a transcendental di­
mension to their being. God alone is eternal.
Therefore al-Ash* ari concluded this argument
by saying:
"it must be a condition of man's power that its 
existence included the existence of its object. 
Since that is so, it is impossible for a man to 
have power over both the being and its contra­
ry. For if he had power over both, both would 
have exist; and that cannot be."26
25, Ibid., p. 78.
26. Ibid., p. 78o
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The non-Islamic element which we mentioned 
above is in connection with the statement that things 
are non-material and have a transcendental dimension 
to their being. This statement is closely related to 
Neoplatonism. Regarding the compilations of Greek 
works which were made available to Islam, it has been 
stated that:
"Those two Neo-Platonic compilations contain vir­
tually all the germinal elements that went into 
Islamic Neo-Platonism: the utter transcendence 
of the First Principle or God; the procession 
or emanation of things from Him; the role of 
reason as the instrument of God in his creation, 
and the locus of the forms of things, as well 
as the source of the illumination of the human 
mind; the position of the soul at the periphery 
of the intelligible world and the link or ®ho­
rizon' between the intelligible and the sensi­
ble worlds; and finally the contempt in which 
matter was held, as the basest creation or ema­
nation from the One and the lowest rung in the 
cosmic scale."27
In this quotation M, Fakhry is not dealing directly with 
our subject of discussion — - but with the situation of 
Islamic thought at a time before al-Ash*ari —  but the 
list given is obviously relevant to our problem. How­
ever we have not precisely pointed out the evidence for 
this claim. What is certain in this regard, according
27. M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 44.
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to al-Ash*aria is that if any one rejects the claim 
that human power or capacity is created, he will fall 
into non-Islamic thought. Therefore, in rejecting the 
Neo-Platonic concepts, he denies that the nature and 
being of the world as well as human power originate 
from eternity. And he also claims that human power 
and capacity regarded as material being exist and re­
late to temporal objects.
His claim that the power of a thing is for that 
thing and not for its contrary, needs a further elabo­
ration. A1-Ash*ari adopted another approach to explain 
and prove that a power cannot affect two motions. He 
said, if one power could affect two motions, then it 
would entail two alternatives, which are equally impos­
sible. The two alternatives are: (a) it would be a
power over two motions which took place simultaneously 
or (b) it would take place continuously or consecutive­
ly. If (a) were the case, then these two motions would 
exist in one place and one time. This would be impossi­
ble because the distinct effects would exist in a single 
point, that is, it is impossible to presume that in a 
single point, occurs two distinct effects at one time.
If (b) were the case then, both of these motions would 
not co-exist with one another, and it has been proved 
before that capacity does not endure. For these reasons.
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it is clear that a single action cannot affect two 
28motions.
On the basis of the previous arguments on his 
understanding of human capacity, al-Ash*ari goes on 
to argue that human capacity is closely related to the 
act which occurs from it and moreover he maintained 
that this capacity exists simultaneously with the act. 
He said :
"Another proof that the capacity is with the act 
and for the act is the fact that he for whom God 
does not create a capacity cannot acquire anything, 
Hence since he cannot acquire the act if there be 
no capacity it is certain that the acquisition 
exists only because the capacity exists. And 
this is equivalently an affirmation that the ca­
pacity exists with the act and for the acts."29
In this additional proof, al-Ash*ari introduced 
the term 'acquisition' for the first time in this dis­
cussion. This argument is also used to complete his 
treatment of the problem which has been discussed phi­
losophically in the preceding paragraphs.
In the previous arguments, al-Ash*ari discussed 
the problem of human capacity independently of its re-
28. Al-Ash ari, Kitab al-Luma , p. 79.
29. Ibid., p. 79.
127
latlon to God's creation of man's capacity. This 
shows that human capacity, though created by God, 
can be discussed within its own being and reality.
In the previous discussions, the only terms analy­
sed were power arid capacity, but in this additional 
argument, al-Ash*ari includes the term acquisition 
as well as God’s power.
Beginning from his position that 'capacity 
exists with the act and for the act', he goes on to 
discuss the relationship of this capacity to the agent 
in which the act takes place. Firstly he takes up 
the bodily instrument of the agent:
"The nonexistence of limb entails the nonexistence 
of the power, and the nonexistence of the power 
entails the nonexistence of the acquisition. For 
if the limb does not exist, the power will not 
exist. But it is because of the nonexistence of 
the power that the acquisition is impossible —  
when the limb does not exist —  and not because 
of the nonexistence of the limb. If the limb 
were inexistent, and the power existed, the ac­
quisition would take place."30
In this argument, al-Ash* ari used * limb* as an example 
of a bodily instrument of man. The non-existence of the 
action is not because of the non-existence of the bodily 
instrument, but because of the absence of power
30. Ibid., p. 80.
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of the act. For if the bodily instrument, in this case 
the 'limb' does not exist, resulting in the existence 
of acquisition, then it would entail the proposition 
that when the limb exists then it necessarily follows 
that acquisition qxists. But, as has been discussed 
before, al-Ash*ari said that man is sometimes capable 
and sometimes incapable, and furthermore, though the 
limb of man exists man is still incapable. For this 
reason it is unthinkable to suppose that the existence 
of the limb entails the existence of acquisition. There­
fore the absence of the bodily instrument of man is not
tegarded as a fundamental cause of the absence of ac-
• 31quisition.
Secondly, al-Ash* ari took up the accident of the 
agent and its relation to capacity and acquisition. To 
begin with, al-Ash*ari discussed 'life' which according 
to most theologians is the most fundamental accident 
among others. They said this because when life does not 
exist then other accidents and attributes or qualities 
do not exist at all. Al-Ash*ari said that the non-exis­
tence of life entails the non-existence of the acquisi­
tion, and elaborated this claim as follows:
31. Ibid., p. 80.
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"Yes, because when life does not exist the power 
does not exist; and it is because of the non­
existence of the power that the acquisition is 
impossible, not because of the non-existence 
of life. Do you not see that life can exist 
along with impotence, so that a man does not 
acquired?"32
Here, again, he comes to the same conclusion as in his 
discussion of the bodily instrument of the agent. The 
absence of life does not entail the absence of acquisi­
tion, but the absence of acquisition is due to the ab­
sence of power as he had claimed in regard to the bodily 
instrument. The reason he put forward follows from the 
premise that though the agent has life, it does not ne­
cessarily hold that he has power. This premise is also 
used by al-Ash*ari in rejecting Abu'1-Hudhail's position 
that ’capacity would exist in the second moment'. Al- 
Ash *ari said that then an act of a man could exist af­
ter several hundred years even though in these several 
hundred years the man could be impotent.
On the question of the knowledge and skill of 
the agent and their relation to ’power’ and 'acquisition', 
al-Ash*ari used the same approach as in the case of those 
of the bodily instrument and life. He said that the ab­
sence of knowledge or skill does not necessarily entail
32. Ibid., p. 80
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the absence of action or acquisition, but the absence 
of knowledge or skill entail the absence of power. The 
absence of power is the true cause of the absence of ac­
quisition or action. By using the example of the know­
ledge of ’how to weave’ and 'the power to weave', he 
argued :
"and since knowledge of how to do it may be accom­
panied by impotence, we know that the nonexistence 
of the weaving is due only to the nonexistence of 
the power to do it, and that, were God to make it 
a custom to create the power to do it along with 
the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do 
it, the weaving would indubitably take place."33
From these three arguments dealing with the re­
lation of power and acquisition to the bodily instru­
ments as well as accidents or qualities of the agent, 
it is clear that al-Ash^ari put a strong emphasis on 
the role of 'power' or 'capacity' in order to realise 
the action or the acquisition of man. The absence of 
acquisition is not immediately due to the absence of 
such bodily instruments or accidents or qualities, but 
due to the absence of power though the power itself oc­
curs through them.
33. Ibid., p. 81.
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Finally, al-Ash‘’ari summarised his position on 
this problem by stating that the absence of 'allowing' 
(this would include God's creation of power) would en­
tail the absence of the acquisition. Analogically, the 
existence of 'allowing' would entail the existence of
acquisition. This is sometimes presented as a an objec-
34tion to his position. Furthermore, as if the answer 
to the question of existence of constitution entails 
the existence of the acquisition or action, he answered:
"That is just what we say, because the constitu­
tion supports only what subsists in it. And 
every objection they urge concerning this point 
is to be answered as we answered the objections 
regarding the limb and life, because the non­
existence of the acquisition is not due to the 
nonexistence of such things."35
Al-Ash* ari's solution to the question of the bo­
dily instrument of the agent and its relation to 'power*
or 'capacity' and 'acquisition' is a direct reply to the 
position of Mu* ammar. Mu*ammar stated that "free will
is to be described as accident and its existence is re-
3 6garded as the action of the bodies themselves." It 
is clear that when Mu*ammar spoke of the occurrence of 
human actions, he argued that their occurrence was due 
to the action of the bodily instrument of the agent. He
34. Ibid., p. 81.
35. Ibid., p. 81.
36o Supra, Chapter 3, p. 56.
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made the body the true cause of the occurrence of those 
actions. From these premises Mu *ammar concluded that 
human actions needed no creator at all. Although we 
did not discuss Mu*ammar's position of 'capacity’ in 
particular in this chapter, we have already discussed 
his position on the question of human action in the pre­
vious chapter and this conclusion is a consequence of 
his position regarding human action.
When al-Ash*ari proposed his solution to the 
question of an agent's qualities, such as life and know­
ledge and their relation to capacity or power and ac­
quisition, he was also dealing with al-Nazzam*s posi­
tion as well as that of Abu'1-Hudhai1, First of all al- 
Nazzam stated that 'capacity is the man himself. This 
position is close to Mu^ammar's. Moreover al-Nazzam ar­
gued that when a man wills he acts and when he does not 
will, he does not act. Moreover he held that will is a 
movement in man. From these statements, it is obvious 
that al-Nazzam emphasized the quality of will in the 
agent as the cause of the occurrence of the actions. In 
other words, the occurrence of the actions of the agent 
is due to the occurrence of will. Though al-Ash*ari in 
his three sets of arguments regarding this problem did 
not directly deal with the quality of will of the agent,
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he did say that "the answer respecting the life is like
37
that respecting the limb" and he gave the same formula 
with respect to the quality of knowledge. Therefore it 
is reasonable to hold that this answer could also be 
applied to the quality of 'will* of the agent.
Up to this point al-Ash*ari maintained that, in 
opposition to the position of al-Nazzam, within the li­
mit of the term 'capacity', capacity is distinct from 
the agent. His claim that capacity exists with the act 
and for the act is regarded as his direct answer to the 
position of the majority of the Mu^tazilites* saying 
that capacity perdures through the occurrence of the 
action in the second moment. And it is regarded as his 
answer to the position of Abu'1-Hudhail who said that 
capacity occurred immediately before the action in the 
first moment. And finally he argued that the occurrence 
of acquisition is due to the occurrence of capacity, not 
depending on the occurrence of the bodily instrument and 
qualities and accidents of the agent. And on the other 
hand, the absence of acquisition is due to the absence 
of capacity and not because of the absence of the bodi­
ly instrument of the agent and accidents and qualities
37. Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 80.
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of the agent. From all these points, al-Ash*ari claimed 
that capacity is created by God, as has been discussed 
before. Moreover, he said that the capacity is with the 
act and for the act and it is due to the fact that he 
for whom God does,not create a capacity cannot acquire 
anything.
3. The Discussion of the Question of Incapacity.
After the discussion of capacity is confirmed 
by citing several passages of al-Qur'an as proof texts 
in supporting his thesis on capacity, al-Ash*ari then 
introduced the question of incapacity (al-^Ajz). This 
problem was introduced by the question of God's obli­
gations and its relation to the incapability of the 
agent. As in his discussion of capacity, al-Ash*ari 
begins by making several important distinctions regar­
ding term.
In Abu'1-Hudhail's theory of moment, in which 
he claimed that the statement, 'man acts in the first 
moment, and the act occurs in the second moment’, it 
can be seen that this would entail the proposition that 
this act is left unformed between the first and second
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moment* This proposition is assumed by al-Ash *ari.
To this proposition, al-Ash *ari added, if that is the 
case, then it would be possible for incapacity to exist 
in between these two moments and so the act would occur 
while the agent .was incapable*
Based on the above hypothesis, al-Ash*ari then 
set out to tackle the problem of God's obligation and 
its relation to the agent who is incapable of fulfil­
ling it. He agreed that God punishes the unbeliever 
because of his iction of unbelief. According to al- 
Ash*ari, this does not mean that man is unable to ful­
fil the obligation of God which is imposed on him. The 
reason he put forward is as follows:
"If you mean by your words that he (^ man"] is in­
capable of believing because of his impotence
to do so   no. But if you mean that he is
incapable of believing because he omits to do 
so and is preoccupied with the contrary of be- . 
lief  yes."38
From this argument, it is clear that al-Ash *ari agreed 
that God’s obligation is imposed on a man who is unable
to believe, in so far as he is an unbeliever, because
such a man is impotent to believe. On the other hand, 
God does not impose an obligation on the unbeliever,
3^ 8» Al-Ash*ari) Kitab al-Luma* , p. 83.
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in so far as he is an unbeliever, who fails to believe 
and includes in his understanding misconceptions of 
belief. For the former, al-Ash*ari is trying to main­
tain that he (the unbeliever) could in some other time 
be a believer, when his impotence in believing is gone. 
The latter which is more complicated is elaborated as 
follows, God does not impose an obligation on the un­
believer, who is incapable of fulfilling that obliga­
tion. Al-Ash^ari argued that in this case the inabi­
lity of the unbeliever to fulfil an obligation is owing 
to the fact that the unbeliever is preoccupied with 
the contrary belief. He said:
"Inability to do a thing is had when both the 
thing and its contrary are beyong one's power. 
Hence it is impossible for one who is unable 
to do a thing to be unable simply because he 
omits to do it."39
This shows that within the limit of his under­
standing of incapacity, the realisation of the unbelief 
of the unbeliever cannot be the agent of the contrary, 
that is, belief. Thus, on the basis of the explanation 
above, al-Ash*ari argues:
39. Ibid., p. 83.
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"If the power to do a thing were also a power 
to do its contrary, by analogy with inability, 
then help to do a thing would have to be help' 
also to do its contrary, by analogy with the 
fact that inability to do a thing is also in­
ability to do its contrary."40
Therefore from this argument, it is clear that the power 
to act is not the power of not acting. Then, in other 
words, the incapacity of belief in this case, is not 
in any sense, according to al-Ash*ari the incapability 
of disbelief. Since this is true, he argued:
"So if such a comparison be impossible, their al­
legation is vain and their objection collapses, 
and there is no necessity of comparing the po­
wer with the inability, since there is no rea­
son which brings them together, and since po­
wer does not belong to the genus of inability."4l
The important point from the above quotation is that al- 
àsh* ari is trying to hold the claim that incapacity is 
not the analogy of power.
After his explanation on incapacity as the basis 
of his understanding of the term, he goes on to discuss 
the relation between the bodily instrument of the agent 
and its relation to incapacity, as he did in the question 
of capacity discussed before. As if to answer the objec-
40. Ibid., p. 83.
41. Ibid., p. 84.
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tion whether God can enjoin an obligation on a thing 
in the absence of a limb (bodily instrument) he rep­
lied ;
"No, because a man is commanded only to accept 
or omit, and when the limb does not exist there 
can be neither acceptance nor omission."42.
Moreover, he argued, since the nonexistence of this bodi­
ly instrument which is needed to execute the act com­
manded would entail the impossibility of acceptance or 
omission of that command, then there is no command in 
this case, because, as in the previous case, incapable 
here simply means unable to do the thing or its contra­
ry. Therefore, it is impossible for God to command a 
man who lacks of limb, and the absence of a limb entails 
the absence of power. This is also true in the case of
commanding a man to pay Zakat (a religious tax) who has 
43-no money.
To conclude his philosophical discussion of the 
problem of incapacity, al-Ash *ari attempts to deal with 
the problem of the act and its contrary which are both 
covered by incapacity. He said, due to the limitation 
of what cannot be done by a man who has no power at all,
42.0 Ibid., p. 84.
43. Ibid., p. 85.
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it is impossible to suppose that the incapability to 
do a thing is distinct from the incapability to do every 
other thing. Furthermore, if death comes about, then 
there would be no actions at all. In this case if the 
incapability of doing a thing is distinct from incapa­
bility of doing every other thing, then it would be 
necessary to say that the nonexistence of acts would be 
due to the existence of all inabilites. A1-Ash*ari 
concluded :
"This would necessitate the presence in one atom 
of two inabilities and two deaths. But if this 
were possible, one of the two could be supplanted 
by life with the result that the same atom would
be simultaneously living and dead ---  which is
absurb."44
The above argument serves to show the impossibility of 
maintaining the position that the 'incapacity to do a 
thing is distinct from the inability to do every other 
thing*. Thus, in this argument, al-Ash*ari tries to 
elaborate his understanding of incapacity with regard 
to the act and its contrary, enlarging the 'incapacity' 
to include both the act as well as its contrary.
Following these discussions as well as the dis­
cussions of the previous chapters, we shall focus on
44o Ibid., p. 85
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al~Ash^ari's philosophical solution to the problem of 
Free Will and Predestination in the following chapter. 
To do this, we shall discuss it in the context of his 
theory of acquisition, the term which was discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter, especially in "The 
Createdness of Human Action® and ®The Discussion of 
Capacity ® o
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CHAPTER SIX
THE THEORY OF ACQUISITION,
In the previous chapters, we have already dis­
cussed the conceptions of the knowledge of God, human 
action and human capacity as viewed by al-Ash^arl,
These conceptions have a very close relation to the the­
ory of acquisition which we are to discuss in this chap­
ter. As far as the theory of acquisition is concerned, 
it was discussed long before al-Ash*ari. The concept 
was introduced by earlier scholars of Islamo For the 
purpose of our present study, we shall discuss the po­
sitions of Dirar b. *Amr (728 - 815 A.D) and al-Najjar 
(who, although his dates are uncertain, was a contem­
porary of Dirar b, *Amr)o The main aim of this chap­
ter is to discuss al-Ash*ari« g arguments and their rela-
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tion to the problems discussed in the previous chapters,
1. The Theory of Acquisition According to 
Dirar b. A^mr and al-Najjar,
In the Mu^tazilite genealogy, Dirar is reputed
to have been the founder of the Basrite School, He
was an influential scholar during his time because he
was a lecturer at the University of Basrah, which was
2also called the 'Majlis® (Assembly). Though he was a 
scholar of the Mu^tazilites, his doctrine of human ac­
tions was not in agreement with the majority of the Mu^ - 
tazilites, sinr:e he held that human actions are created 
by God, Al-Ash^ari reported:
"The ground of the separation of Di: r b. A^mr 
from the Mu^tazila was his view thac the acts 
of men are created, and that one act comes 
from two agents (fa’ilan), one of whom creates 
it, namely God, while the other acquires it 
(iktasaba), namely man; and that God is the 
agent of the acts of men in reality, and that 
men are the agents of them in reality,"!
1, W. Montgemory Watt, Free Will and Predestination 
In Early Islam, p. 65,
2, Ibid., po 62o
3, Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al- 
Musallin, Vol. 1. p. 281, quot'd from W. Montgemory
Watt, Ibid., pp. 104 - 105. See also a1-Baghdadi, 
Kitab al-Farq bain al-Flraq-, edited by Muhammad Badr, 
(Cairo, 1910), p. 201.
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From the above report, it is clear that Dirar 
maintained the omnipotence of God and at the same time 
that man was a responsible agent of his own acts.
Since Dirar held that God and men are the agents of hu­
man actions in their reality, then it is important to 
discuss his ideas about God and man and their relatiôn 
to the human actions. This will serve to show his over­
all theory of acquisition.
Dirar’s idea of the Will of God involves two ca­
tegories :
"(1) That which is the thing willed or, in other 
words, the will to create is the act of creation, 
This formula means that the divine will needs 
no instruments, but passes at once from plan to 
performance. The statement that God's being 
willing is His essence refers to this aspect 
of H5.S will. (2) That which is command, or act, 
or the creation of man's acts. One act can be 
the work of two agents; man's acts are done by 
both God and man; God created them, man acquired 
them."4
This idea of God's will is used to maintain that there 
are two kinds or categories of actions. The first cate­
gory is compulsory creation which does not involve human 
beings, since they are not in need of any instrument.
4. A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, p. 69.
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Whereas, the second category is voluntary actions of man 
which is realised through God's activity of creation 
and man's activity of action. Moreover, both God and 
man are regarded as the real agents of the act.
Regarding Dirar's conception of man, Dirar said' 
that man is body, and this body is composed of accidents. 
Starting from this claim he is reported by al-Ash ^ ari 
to have made the following statements:
"He holds that capacity is before the act and with 
the act and .i t is part of him who is capable."5
Furthermore, regarding Dirar's understanding of 'body* 
and 'capacity', al-Ash^ari reported that Dirar held that 
colour and the like are part of the 'body'. A^-Ash ^ ari 
goes on:
"He is reported to have said that capacity and 
life are also parts of the_body,"6
These are some of the views of Dirar regarding the crea­
tion of human action by God and acquisition by nan.
What is more significant in this connection is that Di­
rar saw man as an active agent and the true agent of
5o Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 281. See also al- Baghdadi
op cit., p. 201.
6o Al-Ash ^ ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al- 
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 345.
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his actions, quite apart from God. This follows from 
his statement that God creates the actions in reality 
and man acts in reality.
We turn now to al-Najjar who was a Murji'ite. 
Regarding his position on the problem of human actions, 
al-Ash^ari gives a detailed account, which is relevant 
for our purpose and can be divided into two sections: 
firstly, al-Najjar's idea about God and secondly, his 
idea about man. On the first he held that:
(1) "There is nothing in the sphere of God's sovereignty
except what He wills; He is ceaselessly willing 
that what He knows will be in its time, and will­
ing that what He knows will not be will not be."7
(2) "In respect of the assertion of the unity of God
al-Najjar held the doctrine of the Mu*tazila, 
except with regard to His will and generosity; 
he opposed them in respect of Qadar; and he held 
the doctrine of postponement (irja' —  the dis­
tinguishing mark of the Murji’a)."8
On the second, that is, his idea about man and his ca­
pacity, he said:
(1) "Man is body and spirit; he has a phenomenal power,
that of acquisition, which is incompatible with 
creative power,"9
(2) "One power is not sufficient for the performance of
7o Ibido, p. 283, quoted from W, Montgemory Watt, p. 106.
8. Ibid., p. 285, quoted from W. Montgemory Watt, p. 107,
9. A. S. Tritton, op cit., p. 72.
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two acts, but for each act a power is origi­
nated along with the origination of the act; the 
power does not endure; the existence or non­
existence of the act depends on the existence 
or non-existence of the power."10
(3} "Man does not act in another, but only performs acts 
in himselfsuch as movements, rest, volitions, 
cognitions, unbelief, faith; man does not make ■ 
pain, nor perception, nor vision; he makes nothing 
at all by way of 'generation* (tawallud)."ll.
Then, with regard to the relationship of God's 
creative power and that of man's acquisition, al-Najjar 
explained that human action is created by God and man 
only acquires it. This is his theory of acquisition.
He said, according to al-Ash^ari:
(1) "The acts of men are created by God; men are the
doers of them."12
(2) "The power (istita^a) may not precede the act; the
help (‘awn) from God is originated in the time 
(hal) of the act along with the act, and this is 
tRe power."13
On the question of believer and unbeliever and their re­
lations to God's Will and obligations, al-Najjar held 
that:
10. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 283, quoted from W. Montgem ry
Watt, Free Will and Predestination In Early Islam* 
pp. 106 - 107.
11. Ibid., p. 284, quoted from W, Montgemory Watt, p. 107.
12. Ibid., p. 283, quoted from W. Montgemory Watt, p. 106,
13. Ibid., p. 283, quoted from W. Montgemory Watt, p. 106,
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(1) "The power of faith is succour, right direction,
grace, kindness, benefit, guidance (tawfiq, tas- 
did, fadl, ni^ma, ihsan, huda): tlpe power of un­
belief *s confusion^ abandonment, affliction, 
evil Cdalal, khidhlan, bala’, sharr)."14
(2) "The believer is a believer, one following the true
religion (muhtadin), whom God succours and guides; 
the unbeliever is abandoned, one whom God aban­
dons and leads astray, on whose heart He makes* 
an imprint (or 'sets a seal' —  taba‘a), whom He 
does not guide nor regard ; God creates his unbe­
lief, and does not do what is good for him; if 
God regarded him and did what was good for him, 
he would be sound."15
(3) "God has imposed duties on the unbelievers which
they are not able to perform., not because of any 
inborn imtence or accidental infirmity, but be­
cause they do not do them (li-tarki-him la-hu)."16
From these reports, we can conclude that Dirar 
and al-Najjar are in agreement in maintaining that human 
actions are created by God. This is in opposition to the 
position of the Mu*tazilites in general. Both wrote be­
fore the time of al-Ash^ari and were regarded as the up­
holders of the theory of acquisition. We have brought 
them into our discussion in this chapter in order to com­
pare the solution of al-Ash^ari regarding the theory of 
acquisition. Though we have mentioned before that both
14. Ibid., p. 283, quoted from W, Montgemory Watt, p. 107
15. Ibido, pp. 283 - 284, quoted from W. Montgemory Watt, 
p. 107.
16. Ibid., p. 284, quoted from W. Montgemory Watt, p. 107,
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Dirâr and al-Najjar agreed in maintaining the created­
ness of human actions, they had of course different in­
terpretations of the problem. The points at which they 
diverged are firstly, the question of the createdness 
of human action by God in reality and man performing ' 
that created action in reality; secondly, the question
of the relationship of capacity and act; and thirdly,'
17the interpretation of generated effects© We shall 
discuss these differences together with their relevance 
for the position of al-Ash*ari later in this chapter.
Having the previous discussion as the background 
to the theory of acquisition as viewed by the early Muslim 
scholars and al-Ash‘ari's predecessors, we are now to ela­
borate al-Ash*ari's interpretation of the subject. How 
is the theory of acquisition dealt with by al-Ash ^ ari?©
How does the theory of acquisition as interpreted by al- 
Ash^ari compare with its use by his predecessors?o These 
questions are the main questions to be discussed in this 
chapter.
2. Al-Ash^ari's discussions of the Theory of Acquisition,
As far as al-Ash*ari is concerned, God has fore-
17. H.Ao Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, (Cam­
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 670.
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knowledge, in the sense that He knows the past, the 
present and the future. He also holds that human actions 
are created by God© Moreover he said that good and evil 
are the creations of God. Human power or capacity is 
also the creation of God. On the other hand, man is 
still regarded as a responsible agent for what he does.
He also maintained that God is a just God though evil 
is created by Him. These positions seem to contradict 
one another. It is through his theory of acquisition, 
that al-Ash^ari tried to reconcile these contradictory 
positions and held that they are not inconsistent with 
the fact that God is a just God, and God is all-power­
ful.
The following questions are posed to explore 
his philosophical treatment of the. subject. If we are 
to assert that God has foreknowledge in the sense that 
He knows everything in the past, present, and future 
and to assert that everything created in the universe 
is created by God’s capability then what is man's share 
of responsibility for his actions?. In other words, 
how is man considered as a responsible agent of his ac­
tions since God knows these actions before they come in­
to existence and He wills and creates them?. Is the 
concept of human responsibility therefore inconsistent
150
with the fact that God knows how a man will act before 
that action exists through man's acquisition?o Is the 
concept of human responsibility inconsistent with the 
fact that God creates everything?. On the other hand, 
is the justice of God inconsistent with the fact that 
God creates evil in the universe?o Is it inconsistent 
with the fact that God creates the power- or capacity of man 
to perform actions?. Moreover, is the omnipotence of 
God inconsistent with the fact that'man has the act through 
acquisition?. These problems are solved in the follow­
ing way, in al-Ash^ari's philosophical arguments of the 
theory of acquisition.
As far as the works of al-Ash* ari are concerned, 
the term 'acquisition'was introduced in M s  discussion 
of the problems which are closely related to the question 
of God's power and God's will as well as of man's action 
and man's power or capacity© In his Kitab a1-Luma*, the 
term is introduced in three separate discussions. First­
ly, the term occurs in his 'Discussion of the Qur'an and 
the Divine Will'. In his answer to the question regard­
ing the speech of God, he argued:
18© Kitab al- Luma* and Al-Ibana A^n Usui al-Diyana.
151
"If God produces in another a necessary writing, 
that other is writing of necessity; and simi­
larly, if the writing be an acquisition, that 
other is writing by acquisition. So if God 
were to produce His speech in another, that 
other would have to be speaking by the speech 
of God."19
This argument is related to the problem of the speech 
of God and we shall not discuss this argument because 
it has little interest in our discussion. Secondly, 
the term also occurs in his 'Discussion of the Qadar'.
In this discussion, al-Ash*ari introduces the term ac­
quisition by posing the problem in the form of a ques­
tion, showing that the term is assumed already to be 
well known to the reader. The question is this: "Why
do you claim that the acquisition of creatures is created 
by God,"^^ To answer this question, al-Ash*ari cited se­
veral passages of al-Qur'an in support of his position. 
Therefore it is more theological than philosophical, 
and outside of our share of interest. However, the term 
is further analysed later in this discussion as a synonym 
for human voluntary actions. From the question quoted 
above and the explanation in the later discussion, al- 
Ash* ari maintains that human acquired actions are crea­
ted by God. Thirdly, the term appears in his 'Discussion
19. Al-Ash* ari, Kitab al-Luma , p. 32.
20. Ibid©, p. 53.
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of the Capacity'. After he argued that capacity is 
distinct from man, that the capacity occurs for the 
act and with the act, he concluded with his additional 
argument that if God does not create capacity for man 
to perform his action, there will be no action performed 
by man. This argument is used to prove that capacity 
is with the act and for the act and also used to prove 
that human capacity or power to perform an action is 
created by God. He said;
"Hence, since he (man) cannot acquire the act 
if there be no capacity, it is certain that 
the acquisition exists only because the ca­
pacity exists©"21
Here again, al-Ash*ari used the term acquisition in re­
lation to human action of the voluntary kind. This ar­
gument is used to show the relationship between God's 
power and man's acquired action and capacity. Both 
man's acquired action and his capacity are regarded 
as the creation of God, in the sense that if God does 
not create the action, there will be no action, and if 
God does not create the capacity, there will be no capa­
city. And furthermore, according to this argument, the 
occurrence of acquisition depends on God's will to cre­
ate both the action and the capacity. Therefore, the 
term here is introduced as a synonym of human volunta­
ry action.
21. Ibido, p. 79.
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The term also appears in his work Al-Ibana *An 
Usui al-Diyana. In this work the term is introduced
in his 'Chapter containing the Kalam concernning God's 
Will'. He said:
"There cannot be, under the authority of God, any 
acquisition (iktisab) on the part of human beings 
that God does not will, just as there cannot be 
any universally recognized act of God's own that 
He does not will,"22
Though in this argument, al-Ash*ari stated the term 'ac­
quisition' in connection with the will of God, he still 
meant the term acquisition to refer to the action of man 
in the voluntary manner. From all these quotations, it 
is clear that the term 'acquisition' has been used to 
apply to the voluntary actions of man, as opposed to 
the actions which are regarded as compulsory.
Before we precede any further to elaborate this 
theory, it is worthwhile and important to give a detailed 
account of al-Ash*ari's doctrine of human action and its 
relation to its agent. As far as human actions are con­
cerned, according to al-Ash* ari, they can be divided in­
to two categories. Firstly, there are actions in which 
man has no power to accept or to prevent them from occur­
ring; this is regarded as compulsory action. The agent
22, Al-Ash*ari, Al-Ibana \n Usui al-Diyana, p. lOâ.
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of this action is God, and man has nothing to do with 
it. The second category is voluntary action in which 
God is the true and efficient creator and they occur 
through human activity, thus they are regarded as man'* s 
by acquisition. Extending this we can say that God 
creates the acquired actions as they really are, then 
man acquires them. This point is described as the es­
sence of the theory of acquisition.
His argument in favour of the distinction bet­
ween the two categories of actions is as follows:
"the man who goes and comes, and approaches and 
recedes, is quite different from one who sha­
kes from palsy or shivers from fever©"23
The former are regarded as acquired actions whereas the 
latter are regarded as compulsory actions. To define 
the compulsory actions, al-Ash*ari said:
"For necessity [[compulsory] means that to which 
the thing is constrained and compelled and 
forced, and from which it can find no way to 
get free or to escape, even though it strive 
to be freed from it and want to escape from 
it and exhaust its endeavors to do so."24
23. A1-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma* , p. 59,
24. Ibid., p. 59,
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This distinction, according to al-Ash*ari, would be ac­
knowledged by everyone. Using the same method of argu­
ment, that is, the method based on the function of human 
knowledge, the Mu*tazilites arrived at a different argu­
ment; they asserted that;
"a man feels intuitively that a thing happens or 
does not happen according to his will© He can 
move or not move. Unless he had the power to 
produce what he wanted, this feeling would be 
inexplicable."25
Prom this statement, it is clear that the Mu*tazilites 
hold that the existence of aa act is dependent on man's 
own will and intention, and this follows the proposi­
tion that if man wants movement, movement will exist. 
This makes the Mu‘tasilites upholders of the doctrine 
of Free Will, or the so-called Libertarians in Islam, 
who hold that voluntary actions are the actions of man's 
intentions and activity. On the other hand, al-Ash*ari 
makes this distinction in order to limit the discussion 
to that of voluntary action or acquired action.
With regard to the problem of the createdness 
of human acquisition by God, al-Ash*ari pointed out 
that God is not only the sole creator of acquisition
25, Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Pi 'llmi 1- 
Kalam, p© 35.
156
(acquired action) as well as of compulsory action, but 
God is also the only real agent of both kinds of actions. 
Al-Ash * ari said :
"It has no agent who makes it as it really is save 
God, and no one with power over it so that it will 
be as it really is, in the sense that he create^ 
it, save God."26
In this statement, al-Ash* ari guarded himself from claiming 
that man is the real maker or doer of his own action, but 
the performance of such an action is to be left to man, 
so that man is regarded as the responsible agent for what 
he has done. He maintained that the true creator of hu­
man acquired action is God alone. Though this problem 
has been discussed in the previous chapter, it is worth 
elaborating it in the present discussion because it has 
a very close relation to the theory of acquisition in par­
ticular.
(i) Man Acqtiires a Created Action With a Created 
Capacity©
Since we have discussed from al-Ash*ari's theory 
that God creates the acquisition of man, and man acquires 
it, the problem arises: how are these two agents (God the
26. Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma* , p. 56.
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creator and man the acquirer) of the one same action 
connected, and how does man acquire that action which 
is created by God?. With regard to the relationship 
between the act of God and of man, al-Ash*ari holds ' 
that the fact that man acquired a move means that the 
action of movement is attributed to him, while that 
same movement is created by God in the sense that God 
creates it as it really is© This means that the move­
ment is not created by man because 'create' is defined 
as making (creating) a thing as it really it is© On 
the other hand, when we say that God creates a movement, 
this does not mean that God Himself moves. According 
to al-Ash*ari, the definition of 'some one moves' means 
that the movement inheres in him. In this case it is 
impossible to suppose that the movement inheres in God. 
Al-Ash*ari gave two passages to support this claim in 
his Kitab al- Luma*. Firstly, he said:
"Similarly, if the acquisition is itself proof of 
an agent who makes it as it really is, it does 
not necessarily prove that the agent who makes 
it as it really is is also the one who acquires 
it: nor does it prove that the one who acquires 
it as it really is is also the agent who makes 
it as it really it©"27
Secondly, he said:
"If I were the creator of my acquisition, when it
27, Ibid., pp. 57 - 58.
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is really a creation of God, then God Himself 
would be moving by the necessary motion which 
He creates in one who moves thereby© Since 
that is impossible, because God creates it 
as the motion of another, we are not cons­
trained by what they say, because our ac­
quisition is a creation of another."28
From these arguments, it is clear, according 
to al-Ash*ari, that God creates the acquisition of man, 
just as he creates the compulsory actions. The acquisi­
tion is thus performed by man in virtue of the power
created by God in him.
Moreover, if the acquisition of man is not to 
be regarded as the creation of God, it would entail 
the position that the universe also is not the crea­
tion of God. In other words, if the proof of the crea­
tedness of human acquired action is invalid, it would 
weaken the proof that the universe was created by God 
and not by some other being. Al-Ash*ari explained:
"Moreover, the same would have to be said of the 
motions of the celestial spheres and of the union 
and composition of the parts of the heavans© And 
if this were so, these things would cease to prove 
that God made them as they are, and one could not 
be sure but that the parts of the heavans have a 
uniter who is not God, and the celestial spheres 
and arranger, and the stars a mover who is not 
God."29
28. Ibid., p. 62©
29. Ibido, p. 61,
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We have already discussed the view that God 
gives us power to perform our acquisition. If that is 
the case, a question arises: is it not true when God
gave us power to perform our acquisition, God would 
have to relinquish His own power?. As far as al-Ash*- 
ari’s theory is concerned, this does not follow. When 
God gives us the power to perform, He does not relinquis
His own power, since:
"For that over which God creates in us power is a 
fortiori the object of His power, just as His 
knowledge of a thing is superior to that which 
He creates in us, and His hearing of a thing is 
superior to that which He creates in us©"30
To the problem of how man acquires an act which 
is created by God, al-Ash'ari explained that this action 
is originated, takes place in time and space, just as 
with compulsory action. This is in line with his solu­
tion to the problem of capacity and its relation to the 
act. Both problems we have discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter. We have discussed the question of 
the acquired actions which take place in time and space
in our discussion of the creation of both compulsory and
31voluntary actions by God. We have also discussed the
30. Ibid., p. 62©
31. Supra, Chapter 3, p. 77©
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argument that capacity is with the act and for the 
32act. Corresponding to these two solutions, we can 
see quite clearly al-Ash‘ari's solution regarding the 
question of how man acquired the action which is creat­
ed by God. In so far as the acquisition is created by 
God, it can only exist if and when God creates in man 
the action as acquisition and the power to perform it. 
Al-Ash * ari argued :
"And when He refrains from making it to be an 
acquisition of ours, it is impossible for us 
to acquire it. So what we have said proves 
that we acquire a thing only after God has 
created it as an acquisition of ours."33
The power of man in this regard is described as
distinct from man not part of him. The reason for this
34claim has been discussed in the previous chapter. Brief­
ly stated, if the power is distinct from man then he would 
always be powerful, since sometimes man is capable and 
sometimes he is incapable. Therefore, it is impossible 
to say that man is always powerful or potent, and there­
fore the power of man is distinct from himself. Moreover, 
this power does not endure. It is regarded as momentary 
in the sense that it exists for the act and with the act.
32. Supra, Chapter 5, p. 126©
33. Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 62,
34. Supra, Chapter 5, p© 120©
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This means that the action and the power come into 
existence at the very same moment. The argument for 
this claim is obtained from al-Ash*ari's proof that 
the capacity cannot precede the act. He said:
"We claim that [[capacity cannot precede the act]' 
because the act must begin to exist either with 
the capacity at the very moment that the latter 
begins to be, or after it. If the former is the 
case, then it is true and certain that the ca­
pacity exists with the act and for the act. But 
if the existence of the act is posterior to that 
of the capacity —  and there is solid proof that 
the capacity does not endure. —  then the act 
must begin to exist in virtue of an inexistant 
power."35
It is quite obvious, according to al-Ash* ari, that the 
power exists for a particular action only© It is not 
as al-Ash*ari demonstrates, for two alternatives (com­
mission or omission):
"it must be a condition of man's power that its 
existence include the existence of its object. 
Since that is so, it is impossible for a man 
to have power over both the thing and its con­
trary. For if he had power over both, both 
would have to exist; and that cannot be."36
Therefore, the existence of the power entails the exis­
tence of the action necessarily. And that power is for 
a particular action, not its contrary.
35, Al-Ash*ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 77,
36. Ibid., p. 79.
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From the above explanation, we can summarise 
al-Ash*ari * s discussion of the problem of how man ac­
quires the action which is created by God. Two sets 
of passages in his Kitab al-Luma* help us to understand 
the problem clearly. Most of these passages have been 
dealt with either in this chapter or in the previous 
chapters. In the first set, al-Ash* ari used the term
’power* and in the second set, he used the terms 'power*
37and 'capacity® interchangeably.
His first set of statements which are concerned 
with the term 'power* are as follows:
"...©the acquirer acquires a thing because it takes 
place in virtue of his created power over it."38
"....the true meaning of acquisition is that the 
thing proceeds from its acquirer in virtue of a 
created power."39
These statements indicate that the acquirer only ac­
quires the act by a power which is created by God© The 
occurrence of the acquisition is due to the occurrence 
of the created power. This means that the absence of 
the created power would necessarily entail the non-oc­
currence of acquisition. Then, the acquirer would not
37. H. A. Wolfson, op cit, pp. 685 - 687
38. Al-Ash^ari, Kitab al-Luma*, p. 58.
39. Ibid., p. 60.
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act. Then al-Ash‘ari goes on to claim that the occur­
rence of the action which is an acquisition has no agent 
who makes it as it really is except God, He said:
"It has no agent who makes it as it really is 
save Godj and no one with power over it so 
that it will be as it really is, in the sense 
that he creates it, save God."40
"Does a man, then, acquire the thing as it real­
ly is, ioe. as vain unbelief and good faith?.
Al-Ash*ari replies] ; This is an error, “He 
acquires unbelief means only that he disbe­
lieves in virtue of a created power. Likewise 
our saying “He acquires faith“ means only that 
he believes in virtue of a created power, with­
out his having acquired the thing as it really 
is."41
These statements clarify what al-Ash*ari means by his 
claim that acquisition is created by God. Man, accord­
ing to al-Ash*ari, does not create the action as it really 
is —  unbelief to be bad and faith to be good. But, God 
creates the thing as it really is. These statements 
are a further clarification of the term 'acquisition' 
and its function© Thus, from this explanation, it is 
clear that God is the creator of the acquisition and 
man is the acquirer. Finally, in this first set of al- 
Ash*ari's explanations of “power", we conclude with his
40. Ibid., p© 56o
41© Ibid., p. 58.
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statement: "When God empowers us over acquired motion
42it must be He who creates it in us as our acquisition." 
This statement indicates that al-Ash*ari is trying to 
establish the concept of the omnipotence of God. The 
occurrence of the acquisition is due to the existence 
of power which is imposed by God on us. If God did 
not empower us, the occurrence of acquisition would 
be impossible. For this reason, God is absolutely 
powerful. Does this mean that al-Ash*ari is a compul- 
sionist?© No, because he claims that man is the ac­
quirer of his action which means that man is responsible 
for his actions.
The second set of the statements emphasized 
the terms power and capacity. In these statements al- 
Ash* ari applied the term 'power' and 'capacity* inter­
changeably. The statements are as follows:
"But since he is sometimes capable and sometimes 
incapable, it is true and certain that his ca­
pacity is something distinct from him©"43
"We claim that [[the capacity cannot precede the 
act] because the act must begin to exist either 
with the capacity at the very moment that the 
latter begins to be, or after it."44
42© Ibid., p. 62.
43. Ibid©, p© 76©
44. Ibid.; p. 77.
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"••othe capacity exists with the act and 
for the act."45
"...the capacity does not endure."46
These statements serve to prove, according to al-Ash^ari, 
that the capacity.is not the man himself, thus man can­
not perform the action naturally. But, the capacity is 
distinct from himself, and it is created by God. The 
occurrence of the capacity or power entails the occur­
rence of the action. It does not exist before the act, 
as claimed by some of Mu/tazilite scholars.
"o..it is impossible for a man to have power over 
both the thing and its contrary. Far if he had 
power over both, both would have to exist; and 
that cannot be."47
"We deny that because a power is a power only 
over what exists with it in its locus."48
These statements are used to support al-Ash*ari’s claim 
that the capacity is for a particular action which exists 
in the hand of man and that power or capacity is not 
for the contrary and for another motion different from 
the motion which exists in the hand of man.
These.two sets of statements provide al-Ash^ari*s 
answer to the problem of how man acquires the acquired
45 o Ibid., Po 77
46. Ibid., P* 77
47« Ibid., p. 79
48 « Ibid., p. 79
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action which is created by God. According to al-Ash 
ari, the occurrence of the acquisition depends on the 
occurrence of the power or capacity. Both are created 
by God. Acquisition is performed by man in virtue of 
that created power. The power which is created is dis­
tinct from man himself. If the power exists in the 
sense that God creates it, it is for a particular act, 
not for its contrary. Moreover, one single power is 
for a single act, not two or more than twoo What is 
more significant here is the claim of the absolute 
ominipotence of God. Though man has his role to act 
freely, it is within the limits of acquisition and 
capacity which are both created by God.
It has been noted before that al-Ash^ari is 
trying to steer a middle course between the two extreme 
positions of the Mu^tazilites and the compulsionists 
(the Jabarites). Therefore, the theory of acquisition 
is also to achieve this goal. The theory of acquisi­
tion is used to establish God as omnipotent and to 
maintain the sovereignty of God on the one hand and 
to establish the justice of God and to claim man's res­
ponsibility for what he does, on the other. According 
to al-Ash^ari, the justification of God's absolute 
pwwer and sovereignty in connection with human life has
167
moral consequences. But, to deny human responsibility 
would result in denying the justice of God. Al-Ash^- 
arl maintained that it was possible to reconcile the 
omnipotence of God and the justice of God.
Al-Ash ^ari gave prime importance in his theolo­
gy to the question of God's absolute power and sovereign­
ty in the world :
"He creates things by His power, directs them by 
His wish compels them by His strength, and re­
duces them by His might; wherefore the proud 
submit to His power, the lofty are subject to 
the strength of His lordship, doubters are cut 
off from a sure foundation in the knowledge of 
Him, to Him the necks of men submit, and the 
prudence of the discreet is confounded in His 
kingdom."49
On the basis of this quotation al-Ash*^ ari is not far from 
the position of the Compulsionists, but it would be wrong 
to put al-Ash^ari in the camp of the compulsionists, since 
he attributes a share of human responsibility for what 
man does. By contrast the compulsionists denied free 
agency in man and ascribed his actions wholly to Godo 
Man is forced to accept what is imposed on him by God.
Thus any thought of human responsibility is in contra­
diction to the theology of the compulsionists. And to 
claim al-Ash^arl as a compulsionist is therefore false.
49* Al-Ash^ari, Al-Ibana A^n Usui al-biyana, p. 43.
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However, the tension is in the relationship of 'the so­
vereignty of God' and 'human responsibility'. Al-Ash 
ari solves this problem in his theology, as can be seen 
from his use of the theory of acquisition.
We have discussed al-Ash‘'ari ' s position that the 
capacity of man does not create his action, rather this 
capacity is used to acquire those actions which are al­
so created by God, Because the true sense of the term 
'creating' is to make things as they really are, this 
will be the same as for all created things. Further, 
al-Ash^ari claims that if man has the power of creating 
in the true sense, it will necessarily mean that things 
will cone into existence not in their reality. This 
is due to the fact that man, according to al-Ash **ari, 
through experience wants, for example, unbelief to be 
good and faith to be bad. This is surely contrary to 
the reality of both unbelief and faith. Since this is 
not the Ccise, therefore it is reasonable to believe thab 
man does not create his own action by his capability.
And since man does not create his own action, and since 
it does not come into existence without an agent who 
acquires it, therefore man is the agent who acquires 
it through the capacity given by God. This capability 
is used for the occurrence of that action.
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Regarding the question of the human share of 
responsibility for what man has done, it is clear from 
the above explanation that al-Ash ^ ari prefers man's 
acquisition rather than man's creation as the solution 
to this question. It has been argued before that if 
man chooses disbelief, in the sense of acquisition, 
then this man will change and become an unbeliever; but, 
if God creates unbelief, He will never become a believer, 
who want unbelief to be good. This means that acquisi­
tion will cause change to the acquirer, but creation 
will not cause such change to the creator,
(ii) The Concept of Human Responsibility is Not 
Inconsistent With the Concept of the 
Foreknowledge of .God,
Perhaps, what is more significant to this problem 
is the question of whether the concept of human respon­
sibility is inconsistent with the claim that God has 
foreknowledge, in the sense that He knows the future?
And is this claim inconsistent with the fact that God 
is an absolutely powerful God in the universe?. The 
Foreknowledge of God and the occurrrence of human ac­
quisition which is foreknown by God before it comes in­
to existence appear to be in contradiction. In the fol­
lowing paragraphs we shall analyse al-Ash‘ari's solution.
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Al-Ash^ari previously demonstrates that God's 
knowledge is eternal and is not identical with His essence 
as well as not distinct from Him. Since it is eternal, 
therefore God knows the thing in the past, present and 
future. In Chapter 2 of this study, we doscussed the 
problem in detail. However, in the present discussion, 
it is worth recalling a set of statements from the pre­
vious discussion.
(1) "All this exists antecedently in God's knowledge.
(2) "The nature of knowledge is to follow the knowable
without acquiring a quality from it nor acquiring 
it as a quality."51
(3) "They are known because knowledge comes into con­
tact with them but does not altero"52
(4) "It is to be believed that God is knowing by know­
ledge rather than God is knowing by His essence."5 3
(5) "But knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the knower
be knowledge, nor can God be identified with His 
attributes, Do you not see that the way in which 
one knows that knowledge is knowledge is that by 
it the knower knows?. For the power of man, by 
which he does not know, cannot be knowledge. Hen­
ce, since God the creator cannot be knowledge. He 
cannot be knowing by Himself. And if that be im­
possible, it is certain that He is knowing by a 
knowledge which cannot be Himself."54
50. Supra, Chapter 2, p. 29.
51. Al-Shahrastani, Kitab Nihayatu'1-Iqdam Fi ^Ilmi'l-
Kalam, p. 79.
52. Supra, Chapter 2, p. 33.
53. Supra, Chapter 2, p. 47.
54. Supra, Chapter 2, p. 50.
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From These statements, it is certain that the function 
of knowledge is only to know but not to bring things 
into existence. It is the condition of knowledge to 
come into contact with the knowable, but not to alter. 
It is the nature of knowledge to follow the knowable. 
Above all, the knowledge is used to discover the truth, 
not to bring things into existence. We have mentioned 
before, that 'creating' is bringing things into exis­
tence as they really are. Perhaps, 'acquisition' may 
be defined as acquiring a thing in virtue of a created 
power. Since the function of knowledge is to discover 
the truth, knowledge is quite unlike creation or acqui­
sition. Since this is the case, therefore, it is ob­
vious that knowledge is not analogous to the term ac­
quisition or creation, and they are not co-extensive.
A further reason is that, as has been mentioned above, 
knowledge does not acquire a quality from the knowable 
nor it acquires a knowable as a quality.
Therefore, man's share in responsibility for 
his own action is not inconsistent with the claim that 
God has foreknowledge, that God foreknows the actions 
of man before they come into existence, for knowledge 
does not affect that existence. It is reasonable to 
believe that God foreknows the actions of man before 
they exist, and man himself has his choice to act.
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(iii) The Concept of Human Responsibility 
Is Not Inconsistent With The Consept 
Of God’s Omnipotence.
The most, significant question to solve is whe­
ther the concept of human responsibility is inconsis­
tent with the claim that God is the creator of all in 
the universe through His capability?. As we have al­
ready seen, God, according to the compulsionists (the 
Jabarites), is the only active powero Furthermore they 
claimed that to attribute a share of thi s to man through 
the theory of acquisition, would entail comparing man's 
power with that of God, which was impossible, according 
to the compulsionists. They made no distinction between 
the statements 'the building stands' and 'the man dies'. 
They held that God makes the building stand and causes 
man to die. Therefore, according to them, there is no 
such thing as a human share of responsibility for what 
man has done. One the other hand, the Mu^tazilites 
claimed that man is the creator of his actions and free 
to perform them. This is certainly in stark contrast 
to the position that God creates everything in the uni­
verse by His capability. As far as these two opposite 
positions are concerned the two elements mentioned above 
can never be reconciled. But al-Ash*ari believed in 
both ideas and proved that the two are not contradicto­
ry. The following statements, which we have discussed
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before, are gathered in order to see clearly al-Ash^ari's 
reconcilation.
(1) "Al-Ash*arl prefers man's acquisition rather thpn
man's creation as the solution to this question."55
(2) "The occurrence of the acquisition is due to the
occurrence of the created power. This means 
that the absence of the created power would 
necessarily entail the non-occurrence of ac­
quisition. "5 6
(3) "The acquisition will cause change to the ac­
quirer, but creation will not cause such change 
to the creatoro"57
(4) "The occurrence of the acquisition is due to the
existence of power which is imposed by God on 
us. If God did not empower us, the occurrence 
of acquisition would be impossible."58
From these statements, it is obvious that what is under­
stood by man's capacity is nothing more than man's acqui­
sition and this brings no effect to the existence of 
an act if God's capability does not create the act. 
Therefore, a human share in responsibility is not in­
consistent with the claim that God is the sole creator 
of the universe, for what al-Ash^ari understood by hu­
man capability does not disturb the works of God in the 
sense that they cannot bring a thing into existence as 
it really it is. Human capability can affect nothing
55. Supra, this chapter, p. 169□
56. Supra, this chapter, p. 162.
57. Supr , this chapter, p. 169
58. Supra, this chapter, p. 164o
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in the universe-
(iv) The Concept of Human Responsibility Xs not 
Inconsistent With The Concept of God's Will,
With regard to the question of God's Will, the 
same question arises; is the concept of human respon­
sibility inconsistent with the claim that God wills 
everything which is to exist? From the very beginning, 
al-Ash*ari held that God wills everything which can be 
willed and de facto are willed.Al-Ash*ari said:
"We maintain this because the divine willing, 
being one of God's essential attributes, as we 
have already proved, must embrace everything 
which can truly be willed,"60
Moreover, he stated:
"The existence of what He did not command from 
another would not entail His weakness ; but the 
existence of what He did not will from another 
would prove weakness. Moreover, the existence 
of what He has not commanded, but has forbidden, 
and yet He has willed its taking place, does 
not mean that weakness overtakes Him."61
These two statements are agreed in maintaining that what
59. Al-Ash ari, Kitab al- Luma*, p. 33 note no. 2 
by McCarthy (the translator).
60. Ibid., p. 33.
61. Ibid., p. 44.
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God wills in the universe will necessarily come into 
existence. On the other hand, what God does not will 
cannot come into existence. Using the example o f the 
unbelief of the unbeliever, his solution to this problem 
becomes clearer^
"Moreover, we have already proved that the exis­
tence of the capacity entails the existence of 
the act. So if God can empower men to believe,
He can also effect that which, had He effected 
it in them, they would have all believed."62
Furthermore, in answer to the objection that God was 
miserly towards man, if the above statement is true, al- 
Ash ari replied with a definition of the term 'miserli­
ness* o
"Miserliness consists in the agent's not doing 
what he ought to do. But when something is a 
matter of generosity he who is generous is free 
to be generous with that or not to be generous. 
And in such a case no miserliness attaches to 
the agent if he does not do the thirtg."63
From this al-Ash‘ari concluded in respect of the ques­
tion posed to him, "God has not effected in unbelievers 
what would ensure their b e l i e f . W i t h  regard to the 
question of God's command, al-Ash^ari argued:
62. Ibid., p. 97.
63. Ibid., p. 98.
64. Ibid., p. 98.
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"Do you not see that He has commanded us to pray 
and to be submissive and to move, yet He cannot 
pray and be submissive and move, because that 
is impossible for Him."65
With reference to the previous explanation, 
the problem of human responsibility and its relation 
to the question of God’s will and ccmmand is somewhat 
obvious. The existence of the unbelief of the unbe­
liever (the example used here) is definitely caused 
by the will of God. The reason is that nothing can 
come into existence without being willed by God. In 
this case,, the existence of unbelief is also regarded 
as the creation of God, and it is an acquisition of 
man in the sense that he acquired it in virtue of the 
created powero Moreover, al-Ash* ari's statement ex­
plains that God wills the unbelief as He created it 
as it really is. And since God's decree is co-exten- 
sive with the term 'God's creation',^^ therefore, the 
claim that man has his share of responsibility for 
what he has done is not inconsistent with the claim 
that God wills everything which exists in the universe,
Previously, we have produced al-Ash*ari's ar-
65. Ibid., p. 101.
66. Supra, Chapter 4, p. 104.
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gument for maintaining the justice of God with regard 
to the creative power of God and its relation to the 
creation. In its true sense, creating is to create 
something as it really is, and the term justice, in 
its true meaning is to bring something to its place, 
therefore, the justice of God, in the sense of bringing 
something to its place is not inconsistent with God's 
creative power, for creating is also bringing something 
into existence as it really exists.However, the con­
cept of God's justice in connection with the creative 
power of God, does not answer immediately the problem 
of the justice of God in its relation to the question 
of human responsibility. Thus the answer of this problem 
of the consistency of a human share of responsibility 
and God's will is also the answer to the problem of God's 
justice and its relation to the problem of human respon­
sibility.
Al-Ash* ari's discussion of the theory of acqui­
sition indicates the clear effort of him middle path 
position in trying to maintain the absolute power of 
God and the absolute justice of God. The extreme po­
sitions of the Mu*tazilites and the compulsionists
67. Supra, Chapter 4, p. 106.
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brought these issues into contradiction. However, the 
theory of acquisition was conceived of long before al- 
Ash^ari. At the beginning of this chapter we discussed 
the positions of Dirar and al-Najjar with regard to their 
conceptions of tHe theory of acquisition. In the follow­
ing paragaraphs we shall discuss their positions in re­
lation to al-Ash*ari's.
(v) Al-Ash*ari's Solutions and their Relation to 
Dirar and al-Najjar,
As we have mentioned before, Dirar departed 
from the majority of the Mu*tazilites in maintaining 
that human actions are created by God, Although human 
actions are created by God, man has his share of res­
ponsibility for what he has done, because man is also 
regarded as an agent for his actions^ This is then 
called 'acquisition'. Probably, for this reason, W„ M. 
Watt credited Dirar with being the first exponent of 
the theory of acquisition.
"Dirar is almost certainly the first exponent of 
the concept of 'acquisition' or 'Appropriation' 
(kasb, iktisab) which eventually became the or­
thodox account of man's voluntary activity,"68
68. W. Montgomery Watt, Free Will and Predestination 
In Early Islam, po 104.
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As far as the term 'agent' is concerned, Dirar 
maintained that God and man are the agents of human 
actions. They both act as the agents to bring the ac­
tion into its reality. In other words, according to 
Dirar, God creates human action as it really is, and 
man acquires that same action as it really is. This 
brought Dirar to the concept of a dual agency in human 
action, which is not in line with the theory of acquisi­
tion as understood by al-Ash*ari. Al-Ash*ari agreed with 
Dirar, as far as God is the creator of human action, in 
the sense that creates it as it really is. But al- 
Ash*ari opposed Dinar's position in maintaining that man 
acquires his action in its reality. Al-Ash*ari said, 
as has been discussed before, man acquires his action 
in virtue of the created power. And man does not ac­
quire the action in its reality, because if man acquired 
the action in its reality, then it would be possible for 
unbelief to be good and faith to be bad and vain. The 
concept of dual agents derived from Dirar's theory is 
one of the points of disagreement between al-Ash* ari 
and Diraro
Al-Ash*ari claimed that Dirar held that capacity 
is part of man himselfo In this regard, we found two 
separate statements by al-Ash*ari. Firstly, he reported
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of Dirar as follows:
"Man is a combination of accidents. So also body, 
it is a combination of accidents such as colour, 
heat, coldo.. j^etcQ. And accident can cause 
change to body. And man can make length, breadth and 
depth, for these are all parts of body."69
In his second report, al-Ash*ari stated;
"He is reported to have said that capacity and life 
also are parts of the body."70
From these reports, it is clear that, according to Dirar, 
capacity is part of man himself. This is not in agree­
ment with al-Ash*ari's conception of man's capacity, in 
which al-Ash*ari argued that if man's capacity is part 
of man's nature, then it would be possible for man to 
be always potent. But that is not the case, therefore 
capacity is distinct from man himself. In this parti­
cular case, al-Nazzam may agree with Dirar in holding 
that man's capacity is not distinct from man himself.
Another point on which al-Ash*ari is not in 
agreement with Dirar is when Dirar holds that capacity 
precedes act, in the sense that "capacity is before
69. Al-Ash*ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyin Wa'khtilaf al-
Musallin, Vol. 1., p. 281.
70. Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 345.
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the act and with the act and it is part of whom is ca-
V"! , _pable." Al-Ash ari however, claimed that capacity
existed simultaneously with the act, for a particular
action.
From all these explanations, it is obvious that
al-Ash*ari's theory of acquisition is in contrast to
that of Dirar. On the other hand, al-Ash*ari shares
the same position as that of al-Najjar regarding the
question of capacity. Al-Najjar is reported to have
claimed that capacity does not precede the act, rather it
exists simultaneously with the act, and capacity does
not endure. As we have seen this is also al-Ash*ari's
position. For this reason it has been said that al-
Ash* ari was not influenced by the Mu*tazilites, such
as Dirar. At this point in his theology he was closer
72to the Murji'ites.
Al-Ash^ari described these two scholars (Dirar 
and al-Najjar) as 'ahl al-Ithbat' (The Affirmers of 
the Qadar). The name 'ahl al-Ithbat' did not belong 
to a particular school or sect, but was given to those
71. Ibido, Vol. 1., p. 281.
72. W. C. Klein, In His Introduction to His Transla­
tion of Al-Ash* ari's Al-Ibana *An Usui al-Diyana,
‘ p. 36,
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who affirmed the divine Qadar though on the other matters
73they may have different positions. It is beyond the 
scope of our interest here to go any further into the 
term 'ahl al-I thbat* o However with regard to the the­
ory of acquisition, it is claimed that al-Ash*ari had 
a very close relation to those members of 'ahl al-Ith- 
bat', since he often discussed the problems which are 
also central to 'ahl al-Ithbat'. Does this mean that 
al-Ash *ari was influenced by them or was al-Ash *ari him­
self one of 'ahl al-Ithbat'?. This question must be 
left to another investigation. As far as the theory of 
acquisition is concerned, it is obvious that, according 
to al-Ash*ari, the problem of Free Will and Predestina­
tion is somewhat answered.
(vi) Conclusion,
The problem of Free Will and Predestination clearly 
indicates al-Ash*arl's middle path position of the ortho­
dox theologian. He accepts the passages of al-Qur'an 
proclaiming the omnipotence of God and so also the pass­
ages proclaiming the justice of God which give a human 
share of responsibility for what man has done. His
73. W. Montgemory Watt, op cit, p. 112.
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reconcilation of this problem is his theory of acquisi­
tion which gave God His part to create human actions as 
they really are and gave man his part to choose and ac­
quire these created actions which then ease the ques­
tion of man's share of responsibility for what he has 
done. An attempt to rationalize the orthodox position 
is therefore attributed to a1-Ash*ari. Without distur­
bing the concept of the omnipotence of God, al-Ash*ari 
made man a responsible agent for what he had done. And 
without sacrificing the concept of the justice of God, 
al-Ash*ari put forward the claim that God is still an 
absolute power. From this study, it is reasonable to 
suggest that àl-Ash*ari's works and intellect mark the 
turning point in the history of Islamic thought, and 
the problem of Free Will and Predestination is a good 
example of his effort to impose philosophical method 
and argumentation on the theology of the orthodoxo
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